C4: အစိးF ရသည် အမည်မသိ ဆက်သယ ွ ေ ် ရး သိမဟF F ့ တ ် လmိM U ဝ4ကက ် ဒ F အ ် သံးF ြပMေသာ လံြF ခံMသည့ စ ် ာပိFစနစ် (encryption)အေပ: ့ ၂ မ4တ ် ကန်သ ် ားသလား။ (၀-၄ မ4တ)် ့ တ်ချက်များ ချမ4တထ C4: Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? (0–4 points) Users’ ability to communicate anonymously has been further restricted by the military since the coup. In March 2021, daily directives banned the use of VPNs, though some orders barring VPN use emerged the month before.267 The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) confirmed that multiple circumvention-tool websites were blocked at least once alongside their IP addresses in February 2021.268 Although the blocking limited some people’s ability to use circumvention tools, internet users continued to employ them. During the coverage period, the military used random street searches of peoples’ devices in order to inspire fear of surveillance.269 The military’s proposed Cyber Security Law would, if adopted, criminalize possession of VPN software and the use of pseudonyms on Facebook, with a sentence of up to three years’ imprisonment in both cases (see C2).270 Businesses in Myanmar condemned the proposal as unworkable in January 2022, as most applications and systems use VPNs for security purposes.271 Despite the law not being formally adopted, military officers searched people on the street and threatened to arrest those with VPNs installed on their devices, collecting bribes.272 Prior to the coup, anonymity was limited by the government’s enforcement of SIM card registration requirements. In 2017, the NLD government enforced mandatory registration whereby subscribers must provide their name, citizenship identification document, birth date, address, 2 nationality, and gender. Noncitizens had to provide their passports.273 Some subscribers reported that service providers required information beyond the bounds of the regulations, including their ethnicity.274 Many did not register.275 In February 2020, the NLD government announced that it had blocked 6.5 million unregistered SIM cards.276 The government also ordered service providers to bar outgoing calls for users of millions more unregistered SIM cards beginning that April.277 After the coup, the military has extended SIM card registration to include mandatory registration of the IMEI numbers of all devices or face deregistration, ostensibly linked to IMEI tax payments mandated during the coverage period (see A2).278 Prior to the coup, the NLD government issued a tender in November 2019 for a biometric SIM card registration system,279 including fingerprints and facial-recognition information,280 and it had requisitioned the money from the USF (see A2).281 It is unclear whether more SIM cards were blocked after the coup began, or whether the military is continuing the biometric plans. There are no clear restrictions on encryption in law, although vague provisions in the Telecommunications Law and the Electronic Transactions Law could be interpreted to restrict the practice. ် ပ်မ/ - ြမန်မာ2ိင 4 င ် ံ Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) and Freedom House - Freedom of the Net: Myanmar - အင်တာနက်ေပ*တွင် လွတလ