B5: သတင်းအချက်အလက် အွန်လင ိF း် အရင်းအြမစ်များကိF အစိးF ရမ4 သိမဟF F ့ တ ် အြခား Dသဇာ\ကီးေသာ ပFဂိpMလ်/အဖွဲUအစည်းများမ4 ၁ မ4တ ် B5: Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? (0–4 points) 1 Yိင F င ် ေ ံ ရးအကျိMးစီးပွား တိးF ြမyင့ရ ် န် ထိန်းချMပ် ထားပါသလား သိမဟF F ့ တ ် ြခယ်လယ 4 ထ ် ားပါသလား။ (၀-၄ မ4တ)် The military has prioritized control over online information to advance the narrative that it is acting to reestablish public order and restore democracy after fraudulent elections. On the first day of the coup, the military seized control of all state-owned media and government communications services,153 including all radio and television channels, as well as related Twitter accounts, YouTube channels, and Facebook pages, which have since promoted the military’s narrative.154 The military then began banning sources of alternative information such as independent media outlets,155 and blocking access to their content (see B6). Several previously independent media outlets were allowed to continue operating,156 but only if they followed the military’s narrative (see B2). Reports released during the coverage period indicate that the military has refined its tactics to spread its narrative online.157 After the coup, the military ordered its soldiers to create social media accounts, spread the military’s talking points online, and troll sources of alternative information.158 Military supporters, including members of nationalist groups, are encouraged to amplify the content.159 A Reuters investigation released in November 2021 identified 200 military personnel operating social media accounts; their posts often spread online within minutes, often via online groups and fan channels of celebrities and sports teams set up by specialized military teams.160 Some social media platforms tried to prevent the military from promoting their narrative online. Following the coup, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Vkontake, and TikTok all to some extent banned the military or its representatives from using their services.161 For example, Facebook removed or reduced the distribution of many pages run by the military or military-owned companies in February 2021, including the military’s “True News Information Team” and state media.162 The pages and accounts of various armed groups were also removed in recent years, as the company deemed them “dangerous organizations.” Prior to the coup, Facebook removed the accounts of military organizations that perpetrated atrocities against the Rohingya and sought to limit the reach of military proxies, banning a number of pages and accounts in 2019 and 2021 for engaging in “coordinated inauthentic behavior.”163 Reporting during the coverage period indicated that Facebook’s moderation of promilitary networks sometimes failed to limit the spread of such content. A June 2021 investigation by Global Witness found that Facebook’s page-recommendation algorithm had been amplifying military content that violated many of its own violence and misinformation policies.164 Internal Facebook documents leaked in October 2021 also identified the platform’s failure to limit the spread of content shared by promilitary accounts.165 Some promilitary disinformation networks have transitioned to Telegram, which offers fewer restrictions. A Frontier Myanmar investigation of promilitary Telegram accounts in September 2021 found that they disseminated content that disparaged armed civilian resistance and ethnic militias.166 The platform had removed some promilitary accounts for incitement to violence as of March 2022, though many more remain.167 While it often voiced a desire for media freedom, the NLD sought to retain control over state-owned media during its time in government.168 As a result, the NLD-led government and the military dominated the broadcasting sector and a significant portion of print media prior to the coup, including those outlets’ online presences, either directly through the Ministry of Information or via joint ventures with private companies.169 ် ပ်မ/ - ြမန်မာ2ိင 4 င ် ံ Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) and Freedom House - Freedom of the Net: Myanmar - အင်တာနက်ေပ*တွင် လွတလ