However, more than anything else, it was the absence of postponements in Chin’s Paletwa township, the most conflict-torn in Western Myanmar, that fueled the perception that the UEC-announced cancellations largely overlapped with the interests of the ruling party. 90 instances of armed conflict had already been recorded there in 2020 alone, whereas no clashes were reported in Pauktaw and only one in Toungup, both Rakhine townships where elections had been postponed 61. The NLD currently holds every elective position in Paletwa. The UEC initially defended its decisions, stating that the list was drafted upon the advice of local election sub-commissions and the government, including two military-controlled ministries. However, on 27 October, it amended the list of locations where polls would be postponed. Due to reports from the respective sub-election commissions and ministries, election cancellations were rescinded for three village tracts in Kyaukpyu township and four village tracts in Ann township of Rakhine state, as well as one ward in Muse township, one village tract in Lashio township, and another in Kunlong township, all in Shan state. On the other hand, the UEC now included 94 village tracts of Paletwa township, the conflict-torn township in southern Chin State, in the list of no-voting areas 62. Even so, these reversals did not go untainted by accusations of favouritism. In Southern Rakhine state for instance, candidates and stakeholders interviewed by ANFREL observers reported that the areas where cancellations had been overturned were nearby military camps and had higher chances to see the NLD or USDP win over local ethnic parties. The poll cancellations described above had a negative impact on the transparency and legitimacy of the 2020 Myanmar general elections. The identification of townships and village tracts that were subjected to cancellations was conducted in an opaque, arbitrary, and inconsistent manner. The discretionary nature of these decisions led them to be perceived as partly targeted at ethnic political parties which were expected to win in these areas, thereby marginalising them even more and fueling resentment against the ruling party and UEC. The UEC should strive to adopt a more transparent approach to decision-making in order to project neutrality and accountability. Electoral stakeholders, including political parties and civil society organizations, should have been consulted before disenfranchising over 1.5 million eligible voters well into the campaign period. Election officials should also resort to election postponements only when necessary because of security concerns, and then strive to use consistent and rational criteria. While some areas were without a doubt too dangerous to hold elections, many others could reasonably have conducted safe polling operations in order to ensure as many voters as possible were effectively heard. In fact, the no-voting areas delimited by the UEC were “greater than what the Tatmadaw recommended”, according to Brigadier General U Zaw Min Tun 63. Inaccessibility-Related Postponement While most cancelled elections had to do with the local security situation, inaccessibility was cited as the reason for cancelling polls in Aye Mon Tharyar village (Chaung Chi) of Tanintharyi region. On 23 October 2020, the UEC sent a letter informing the Myeik district election sub-commission that due to the difficulty in transportation, the village would be excluded from voting in the 2020 general elections. U Hlaing Bwa, secretary of the Myeik district election sub-commission, explained that travel to remote 61 https://www.facebook.com/minzawoo/posts/10106247693194707 http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-10/27/c_139471521.htm 63 https://mailchi.mp/frontiermyanmar.net/has-the-uec-gerrymandered-rakhine 62 27