Case 1:20-mc-00036-JEB-DAR Document 10 Filed 08/18/20 Page 17 of 29 its agents, have violated the terms of Facebook’s use policies by engaging in, among other things, “coordinated inauthentic behavior,” inciting violence, engaging in hate speech, and using fake accounts.23 Indeed, because these actors have misused its platform, their Facebook accounts, pages, and other content have been removed and, in some instances, Facebook has blocked violators from the use of its service. See, e.g., Removing Myanmar Military Officials from Facebook, Facebook (Aug. 28, 2018) (updated Dec. 18, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/08/removing-myanmar-officials/ (“Today, we are taking more action in Myanmar, removing a total of 18 Facebook accounts, one Instagram account and 52 Facebook Pages, followed by almost 12 million people. We are preserving data, including content, on the accounts and Pages we have removed.”). Because these actors have engaged in use that is not “duly authorized” they are not “user[s]” within the meaning of the SCA, and thus not protected under the Act.24 c. The SCA does not apply because the content Facebook has removed from its platform is not a “communication while in electronic storage” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1). The SCA also does not apply to any content that Facebook has removed from the system; content that forms virtually all of the subpoenaed information. In particular, the Gambia’s requests are limited to information that Facebook has removed from its platform such that the information is not “in electronic storage” as required by the Act. Indeed, with respect to the 23 Nathaniel Gleicher, Taking Down More Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior in Myanmar, Facebook (Aug. 21, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/08/more-cib-myanmar/; Nathaniel Gleicher, Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior From Russia, Iran, Vietnam, and Myanmar, Facebook (Feb. 12, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/02/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior/; April 2020 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report, Facebook (Apr. 2020), https://about.fb.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/April-2020-CIB-Report.pdf. 24 See, e.g., Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting “authorize” under section 2701 and holding that ISP did not “authorize” access where defendants accessed information by exploiting a known mistake—i.e., the ISP’s belief in the validity of the subpoena). 11