Myanmar: Analysis of the Organisation Registration Law “poses a grave risk to the continued existence of organisations that engage in activities perceived to be threatening to the State”.115 The highly ambiguous procedures in the NGO Law for responding to complaints against NGOs, and the general review of an NGO which they can trigger, both substantially restrict freedom of association. Neither procedure has any protective safeguards, for example, to ensure that investigations are only undertaken when there is evidence of misconduct or prevent overreach by investigating authorities. They also fail to provide NGOs with proper notice of the fact that they are under investigation or with an opportunity to respond or to correct any lapses in compliance. Instead, the NGO Law appears to authorise essentially ad hoc monitoring upon the receipt of a complaint or at the discretion of the relevant sector government entity. The inspection powers granted to the registration boards, GAD and other government bodies also represent illegitimate restrictions on the freedom of association of registered NGOs. Inspections of accounts or activities should only occur if there are “reasonable grounds to suspect that serious breaches of the law have occurred or are imminent.” 116 Inspection procedures must not be arbitrary and should only occur after advance notice is given to the NGO, while searches and seizures should be only be undertaking following judicial authorisation. 117 The NGO Law offers no such procedural protections. Investigations can apparently be conducted at any time and without any suspicion of illegal activity. Similarly, organisations should be self-governing, without State interference in their internal affairs. They should not have to obtain permission to make changes to their internal management or structure, for example. 118 At most, NGOs should be required to inform authorities following such changes rather than to obtain advance permission. The NGO Law’s requirements in this area are particularly onerous, imposing a duty to obtain permission for even an address change, where it is clear that a simple notification procedure would suffice. External interference with internal management of an NGO should only occur in “extremely exceptional circumstances” and not as a routine matter: Intervention should only be permissible in order to bring an end to a serious breach of legal requirements, such as in cases where either the association concerned has failed to address this breach, or where there is a need to prevent an imminent breach of said requirements because of the serious consequences that would otherwise follow.119 115 2014 Report of the Special Rapporteur on assembly and association, note 35, para. 58. Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, note 84, para. 68. 117 Ibid., paras. 68-69. 118 Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa, note 14, para. 36; OSCE and Venice Commission, note 33, para. 169; and 2009 Report of the Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders, note 99, para. 121. 119 OSCE and Venice Commission, note 33, para. 177. 116 The Centre for Law and Democracy is a non-profit human rights organisation working internationally to provide legal expertise on foundational rights for democracy. 26