other half worked for outlets that had either closed down or still maintained some core operations inside Myanmar’s borders, many in hiding or within areas administered by ethnic armed organizations (47%).67 DIVERSE EDITORIAL POSITIONS The military detained journalists working for outlets that held a range of different editorial positions on the coup. Unsurprisingly, a large proportion of detained journalists worked for outlets that had adopted somewhat pro-opposition editorial positions (68%). A few detained journalists worked for outlets that were editorially very pro-opposition (6%).68 However, the military’s arbitrary crackdown also resulted in the detention of a significant minority of journalists who were working at outlets with somewhat pro-military editorial positions (12%). In what further demonstrates its arbitrary and sweeping approach to repressing journalism, the military even detained some journalists working at outlets with highly pro-military positions (5%). Detentions by Editorial Position 6% 68% 10% 12% 5% Very Pro-Opposition Somewhat Pro-Opposition Impartial Somewhat Pro-Military Very Pro-Military 67 The military was unable to consolidate nationwide control after the start of the coup d’état on 1 February 2021, leaving large areas of territory controlled by either an oppositional group, or by no clear institution. Previous administrations did not control all territory too, but did control more, and control more substantively. See: OHCHR (2023), “Illegal and Illegitimate: Examining the Myanmar Military’s Claim as the Government of Myanmar and the International Response”. 68 Editorial positions on the coup were established through a content review. Assessing Detentions of Journalists in Myanmar, Feb. 2021 to Feb. 2025 22