Impact on media outlets The military both directly censored individual media outlets and indirectly attacked them by detaining their journalists in an effort to shut down the public’s largest and most trusted source of information about the coup.58 The failure of successive administrations to properly protect the rights to freedom of expression and association in the law helped enable the military’s general crackdown on the media (see Annex). For example, the military used the compulsory licensing requirements in the Printing and Publishing Law (2014) to revoke the licenses of at least 15 print media outlets during the period under review, effectively banning them.59 The military did not need to revoke television or radio licenses because the previous NLD government had refused to implement the Broadcasting Law (2015) and therefore had not awarded any.60 Fortunately, the military’s general crackdown, news office raids, and revocation of licenses did not result in most media outlets closing down.61 Many outlets and journalists had already experienced operating under threat. However, revocation of licenses increased the risks faced by all involved, including journalists. For example, the military’s 2021 “amendment” of the Broadcasting Law (2015) criminalized individuals caught working for an unlicensed outlet punishable by up to five years imprisonment.62 DETAINED EMPLOYEES Most if not all of the 112 media outlets identified as serving Myanmar communities have been affected by a variety of serious violations of the rights to freedom of expression and association since the coup started (96%).63 At least 99 of the 112 outlets had journalists detained during the period under review (88%), and almost half had journalists convicted and sentenced to imprisonment (41%).64 The following table shows that many outlets had not just one but several journalists deprived of their liberty (42%). One media outlet had 14 of its journalists detained. 58 A minority of affected journalists were freelancers (17%), although many of them were still associated with a particular media outlet. 59 The military’s 2023 “amendment” of the Printing and Publishing Law (2014) removed the only weak procedural safeguards, leaving licenses under the unfettered control of the military. 60 Mizzima and DVB were temporarily allowed to operate on channels licensed to the state media. They did not have their own broadcast licenses issued under the Broadcast Law (2015) which was never implemented. 61 The Guardian (2021), “Myanmar security forces raid media HQ as opposition crackdown spreads”. 62 Revocation also increased the potential legal risk faced by others, such as sources or service-providers, interacting with the unlicensed outlet. FEM (2021), “Criminal media laws return, internet threatened”. 63 Serious violations included detentions, license revocation, asset seizures, and targeted acts of violence. 64 This includes journalists working on staff contracts and journalists regularly employed under other contractual agreements, such as stringers and freelancers or “citizen journalists”. Assessing Detentions of Journalists in Myanmar, Feb. 2021 to Feb. 2025 20