Moreover, ASEAN’s engagements with the junta can never and will never serve as “a crucial step to building trust and bridging differences among different stakeholders.”16 Letting the junta take Myanmar’s seat has only caused further loss of the Myanmar people’s trust in ASEAN. With a massive trust deficit between ASEAN and the Myanmar people, ASEAN—because of its own failure—cannot and should not expect any tangible or sustainable outcomes from its so-called “Myanmar-owned and -led” approach. ASEAN’s decision to “[e]xpedite” its misguided approach through “informal consultation[s]”17 clearly aims to impose quick-fix solutions for its state-centric approach to stability, which will only keep Myanmar trapped in a cycle of violence and military tyranny.18 It is of grave concern that, with this decision, ASEAN is likely to put pressure on revolutionary forces and civil society to engage or compromise with the military junta, with the alleged goal of “restoring peace, stability, [and] democracy.”19 But this rush to stability—without the protection of human rights and without justice and accountability—will only enable the recurrence of military dictatorship in Myanmar, precluding any hope for a durable peace and genuine stability.20 “An inclusive and durable peaceful resolution”21 can only be achieved in Myanmar by completely dismantling the criminal military institution and establishing a civilian-led federal democracy that guarantees human rights for all communities in Myanmar. Thus, for regional peace, security, and stability, it is in ASEAN’s best interest to fully support the establishment of a federal democratic Myanmar free from military tyranny. ASEAN’s idea of peace—defined by returning to “business as usual”—ignores the lessons from Myanmar’s past decade. ASEAN must learn those lessons and change its approach accordingly: During the previous so-called “peace process” resulting in the failed “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement,” the rush to negotiate with the Myanmar military prevented the process from being genuinely democratic and inclusive, and eroded trust among those in opposition to the military.22 That process kicked off with a one-sided agenda framed and dominated by the military, denying other stakeholders any safe and meaningful opportunities to participate equally in the development of the process, much less be involved in decision-making therein.23 Furthermore, bringing the “conflicting parties”24 together—with Myanmar military on one side and revolutionary forces on the other—cements a problematic assumption that the Myanmar military will be a part of the power structure going forward. This assumption also contravenes the reality on the ground and undermines the people’s tireless efforts to build a new, peaceful federal democratic Myanmar, free from military tyranny. Townships covering 86% of the country’s territory and including 67% of the national population are not under stable junta control.25 Moreover, as the military junta suffers major losses and teeters on the brink of collapse, the Myanmar people’s revolution continues to gain more effective control and establish and strengthen people-led governance through civilian Ibid. at para. 6. Ibid. at para. 15. 18 Khin Ohmar, “Quick fixes will never be the solution for peace in Myanmar,” DVB, 21 September 2024, https://english.dvb.no/quick-fixes-will-never-be-the-solution-for-peace-in-myanmar/. 19 ASEAN, supra note 1 at para. 4. 20 Khin Ohmar, supra note 18. 21 ASEAN, supra note 1, para. 12. 22 Khin Ohmar, supra note 18. 23 Ibid. 24 Panu Wongcha-um, “ASEAN plays 'stabilising' role on regional tensions, secretary-general says,” Reuters, 10 October 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/asean-plays-stabilising-role-regional-tensions-secretary-general-says2024-10-10/. 25 “Briefing Paper: Effective Control in Myanmar 2024 Update,” Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, 30 May 2024, https://specialadvisorycouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/SAC-M-Effective-Control-in-Myanmar-2024-UpdateENGLISH.pdf. 16 17 4