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The IBR traffic is collected through the UCSD Network Telescope, an almost entirely unutilized /8 IPv4 address block, estimated to observe 1/256th of all the IBR generated in the Internet. • BGP: IODA uses the collection infrastructure operated by the RouteViews and RIPE RIS projects and infers the state of the routing tables exported by hundreds of operational routers by processing BGP updates and RIB dumps. It extracts information about which network blocks (BGP prefixes) appear reachable on the Internet control plane from most of these vantage points. IODA’s approach counts visible /24 blocks instead of prefixes, quantifying which fraction of the address space normally announced by an AS or from a region is reachable at a certain point in time. 34