Buddhist nationalism. Many troll accounts of Myanmar celebrities were created and some anti-Muslim celebrities such as Shwe Eain Si and Nay Toe were involved in spreading hate speech against Rohingya on Facebook.98 Usually, troll accounts and other accounts such as fake celebrity accounts post normal news and stories most of the time but are sometimes activated to promote hate speech or attack opponents. Tatmadaw agents create these popular celebrity accounts, pages, and groups and grow them to at least 5,000 followers. Once an account, page or group becomes well-known, troll operations take it over. The troll accounts and pages are not always typical celebrities and can be named for soldiers, monks, government officers, artists and ordinary citizens. Example of Facebook pages and accounts are: Wirathu, Ye Moe, Maung Maung Aung, Hla Shwe, Nay Zin Latt, Ye Htut, and Zaw Htay. The current and former officials involved in cyber warfare operations on Facebook were fed the same propaganda at military academies. They studied and were brainwashed with anti-Muslim nationalism textbooks. Hate speech and disinformation is systematic and institutionalized. We can even call it state-sponsored hate speech against a particular minority religious group. Four departments in the military play significant roles in the Tatmadaw’s psychological warfare on Facebook, which is known among the military leadership as “cyber warfare”, under the instruction of the commander-in-chief. They are the Directorate of Psychological Warfare and Public Relations, Military Affairs Security, the office of the chief of military training and the Directorate of Computers. In the military’s command structure, the top three men at the center of these efforts are commander-in-chief Min Aung Hliang, deputy commander-in-chief Vice Senior General Soe Win and joint chief of staff General Mya Tun Oo. Under them other key people are Lieutenant General Soe Htut, Lieutenant General Tun Tun Nyi, Lieutenant General Maung Maung Aye and Colonel Aung Khine Soe (as of January 2018). 99 The involvement of the military training department is noteworthy. There is a military think tank called the Office of Strategic Studies under the chief of military training. The think tank is one of the brains of the Tatmadaw’s psychological and cyber warfare on Facebook. At first, the Office of Strategic Studies was formed under the Directorate of Defense Service Intelligence in the 1990s, which was abolished in late 2004. In the late 2000s, it was established again under the chief of military training with generals who were designated as a “reserve force” after Military Intelligence was purged.100 According to an official who worked at the psychological warfare department: Coordination and teamwork are principles of cyber operations. For example, when the bodies of Mro ethnic villagers were found in the Mayu mountains, they coordinated the framing of the news and collectively designated the issue a threat to national sovereignty, race, religion and security and launched the ‘Save Myanmar, Save Rakhine’ campaign on Facebook.101 Hundreds of soldiers have been reported to be working three shifts a day at military units in Nay Pyi Taw, Yangon and Pyin Oo Lwin. The operations are overseen by general staff officers. Approximately 3,000 soldiers have studied in Russia since the early 2000s. Making fake news, hate speech, and character assassinations were a part of the operation, and while staff coordinate with each other, they play different roles—the military intelligence collects information, then based on this information, they work together to produce and spread hate speech and fake news on social media. During my interviews, a former official who has a wealth of knowledge about the issue said: There is up to an estimated 700 staff working for military propaganda on Facebook in Naypyidaw, Yangon and Pyin Oo Lwin … They were overseen by a general staff officer-1 who is a colonel (also known as ‘Colonel GS-1’). In the operation structure, there are three general staff officers-1 at each department of the military. Hence about 12 general staff office-1 are involved in overseeing the operation.102 The author traveled in late February 2018 to Mrauk-U Township, Rakhine State and met Maung Kyaw Nyunt, a Rakhine village headman. He said he found on Facebook that the photos of a dispute between Rakhine Buddhists in his village were framed as Rohingyas attacking ethnic Rakhines in Maungdaw Township. He stated, “I know the photos are of the issue in my village. That is why I noticed the post was fake. But other (ethnic) Rakhines will believe it is real”.103 Spreading misinformation and hate speech across multiple platforms is part of the Tatmadaw’s tactics. The way official pages, media pages and troll accounts portrayed the AA, the new and growing insurgent group in western Myanmar in early 2019, is an example. The AA was framed as having an “alliance” with ARSA. The proposition was first spread by troll accounts, pages, and groups on Facebook. Then the Myanmar Cable Network, founded and funded by the Ministry of Information, did a series of reporting and roundtable talks framing the AA as an ally of ARSA.104 Then, similar stories were published in other media outlets such as Eleven Media.105 An independent news outlet, The Irrawaddy, also reported the information. The media reports were followed by the State Counselor Office’s spokesman Zaw Htay’s press conference106 and then a Tatmadaw press conference. This loose network of reporting and repeating fake news and disinformation is part of the reason why the campaign was successful in convincing some followers and bystanders. The pattern of the anti-Rohingya, anti- democracy movement and pro-military trolls accounts and pages on Facebook in Myanmar is very similar to Russian tactics, although the Tatmadaw has reportedly sent students to four countries, Russia, China, India and North Korea, to study information technology. Burmese military students were reportedly in St. Petersburg where many Russian technology companies are based. A noticeable one is the Advanced Internet Agency which is on the US blacklist for making fake news. The Tatmadaw purchases technology from China, particularly from ZTE and Huawei. There was also a news report of Israel helping the Tatmadaw and Myanmar authorities in this regard, including with wartime communication equipment.107 When Facebook deleted several accounts associated with the Myanmar military, the military did not know it was an action by Facebook and first thought it was cyber-attack. The military suspended key generals’ trips on the day and held an emergency meeting. Troll accounts accused the government led by Aung San Suu Kyi of being behind the action. The Tatmadaw uses Telegram and Twitter, but Min Aung Hlaing’s official Twitter account was frozen in May 2019. The Tatmadaw created an account and page for Min Aung Hlaing on Vkontakte, often known as VK, a Russian social media website, but VK also banned his account. An official web page of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing was also created and remains active.108 In early 2018, a brigadier general level official at the War Office was sacked after he posted about a staff reshuffle in a Viber group and now all officials except the commander-in-chief and the deputy commander-in-chief are not allowed to use smartphones while on duty at the War Office.109 Conclusion The militarization and military crackdown against the Rohingya people in northern Rakhine State under the title of a “counter-terrorist” campaign remains a man-made humanitarian crisis. As of early 2018, both the government and the military of Myanmar are under escalating international pressure including at the United Nations Security Council. In response, the Myanmar government formed two commissions in October and December.110 A border guard police chief in Rakhine State, Police Brigadier General Thura Saw Lwin was replaced with Police Brigadier General Myint Toe from Mandalay in October after serving one year. The Rakhine State police chief reshuffle was not in response to atrocities but related to providing information directly to the civilian chief minister of the state, rather than to the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs.111 The LID 99 which was mobilized in August 2017 was withdrawn from northern Rakhine State in late November that year.112 Commander Major General Maung Maung Soe of the Western RMC was also moved on, but his removal from the commander post was unlikely due to a crisis within the military, and was more likely for failing to defeat the AA in Rakhine and Chin states in later months.113 U Zaw Htay, the then-State Counselor’s Office Director General who posted fake photos about the situation on government social media pages was moved on to be director general of the Union Peace Making Commission. However, until the time of writing, there has been no proper response to the atrocities and no real action taken on those responsible. Endnotes 1 According to Myanmar government and military state media announcements (Myanmar News Agency). 2 Myanmar Anti-Terrorism Central Committee, 2017. 3 Safi, 2007. 4 Following decades of military and one-party rule, a new military junta ruled Myanmar from 1988 to 2011, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council from 1988 to 2007 and then the State Peace and Development Council from 2007 to 2011. 5 Maung Aung Myoe, 2009, p. 80. 6 UNHCR, 1992. 7 Former government officials, personal communications, 2017. 8 See reports released by Amnesty International from that time, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/page/2/? qlocation=1821&sort=date-asc. 9 General Khin Nyunt was powerful from 1988 to 2007 when he and his military intelligence officers were purged from the junta. 10 Military observers, personal communications, 2017. 11 Information obtained from official documents on police structure in Rakhine State. 12 A former senior military officer, personal communication, 2017. 13 Former General Thein Sein was President of Myanmar 2011-2016. He was also chairman of the military proxy party the USDP. 14 Wai Moe, 2016. 15 Ahmed & Liton, 2018. 16 U Kyaw Hla Aung, personal communication, November 2016. 17 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, 2017. 18 Ye Mon, 2016. 19 Mro is one of the ethnic groups identified by the government in Rakhine and Chin states. 20 Six villagers killed, 2017. 21 The ANP was formed from a merger between the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP) and the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) in 2015. The RNDP formed by Rakhine nationalists won many constituencies in the 2010 elections and the ALD was the biggest political party in Rakhine State during the 1990 elections. The ANP is extremely electorally popular in Rakhine State. 22 Aye Maung is a controversial Rakhine nationalist and member of parliament who once said he would throw Rohingya Muslims into the Bay of Bengal. 23 General Min Aung Hlaing’s official page was removed by Facebook in August 2018 after Mark Zuckerberg testified about hate speech against the Rohingya population on the social media platform at the US Senate in April. 24 Ye Mon, 2017. 25 General Sein Win has been the minister of defense since August 2015. He was reportedly set to retire in 2017, but there has been no official announcement yet. 26 Diplomats and other officials, personal communications, 2017. 27 Zaw Htay is a former major ranking military officer. He has served as spokesman for both Aung San Suu Kyi and Thein Sein. He was also director-general of the State Counselor Office. 28 Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not martial law. Myanmar’s colonial era Penal Code states “whoever, being armed with any deadly weapon, or with anything which used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, is a member of an unlawful assembly, shall be punished with imprisonment of their description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both”. 29 Myanmar State Counselor’s Office, 2017. 30 The LID 33 headquarters is near Mandalay. The LID 33 has been involved in military offensives in Northern Shan and Kachin states. It is notorious for human rights violations. 31 The LID 99 headquarters is in the military town of Meiktila. It has also been involved in offensives in Kachin and Northern Shan states in recent years and is infamous for human rights violations. 32 Military observers, personal communications, 2019. 33 Agence France-Presse, 2017. 34 The so-called “Yangon government” refers to the situation in the 1950s. At that time, Burma’s government faced massive multiple rebellions across the country and the government and Tatmadaw only controlled mainly Yangon areas. 35 Komer, 1972. 36 The General Staff College is one of Myanmar’s military graduate schools for tactical officer candidates of colonel rank. 37 According to a copy of the textbook shown to the author by a military officer. 38 Posted on Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s Facebook page on 15 November, 2017 and subsequently removed by Facebook. 39 Military observer, personal communication, 2017. 40 Holmes et al., 2017. 41 Nang Mya Nadi & Aye Nai, 2012. 42 Posted on Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s Facebook page and subsequently removed by Facebook. 43 Sighted in The Brief History of Myanmar and Tatmadaw’s Role from 1948 to 1988, published by the Myanmar military, in Burmese. 44 According to a military textbook seen by the author. The military textbooks in Myanmar are highly classified and not available publicly. 45 Military source, personal communication, 2017. 46 Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2017. 47 Statement posted on the Facebook page of the office of the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw. Facebook removed the page in August 2018. 48 Tay Za is the Tatmadaw’s Officer Training School for non-graduated young men. Commanders involved include Western RMC’s commander, Major-General Maung Maung Soe, from DSA intake 27, the Southwestern RMC’s commander, Major-General Tay Za Kyaw of officer training school intake 73, Commander of the Sittwe ROC Brigadier-General Hla Myint Soe, Brigadier-General Myint Aung, graduate of Tay Za 11, LID 33 Commander Brigadier-General Aung Aung, LID 99 Commander Brigadier-General Khin Hlaing who graduated from Tay Za 17, Brigadier-General Khin Maung Soe, commander of the MOC-15; Colonel Aung Aung of Tay Za 19, commander of MOC-9; and Brig-General Aung Zayar of Tay Za 22, commander of MOC-5. 49 Military sources, personal communications, 2017. 50 Wai Moe, 2014. 51 The Daily Eleven’s interview with Min Aung Hlaing in 2015, no link available. 52 There will be three gateways, 2004. 53 Funds for treatment, 2006. 54 Over 30 gov’t soldiers killed, 2009. 55 Wai Moe, 2011. 56 Military sources in 2017 said Min Aung Hlaing still visited Than Shwe regularly and reportedly listened to advice from the old general (personal communications, 2017). 57 Another Military General, 2011. 58 Unspecified article in the Global New Light of Myanmar, November 6, 2016. 59 Wirathu is an extreme Buddhist monk from Mandalay who makes public anti-Muslim racist talks. 60 King Thibaw (1859-1916) was the last king of the Konbaung Dynasty. He was overthrown by the British in 1885 and deported to India, where he died. 61 Ceremony marking 100th anniversary, 2016. 62 Military and business sources, personal communications, 2017. 63 According to several interviews with senior officials working with both the USDP and the NLD governments. 64 Military source, personal communication, 2017. 65 According to the military’s 2008 constitution, the President has the authority to call a meeting with the commander-in-chief. 66 Civilian and military sources, personal communications, 2017. 67 Military sources, personal communications, 2017. 68 Military sources, personal communications, 2017. 69 Former staff of Aung San Suu Kyi, personal communications, 2017. 70 According to military documents seen by the author. 71 Maung Aung Myoe, 2009, p. 213. 72 Wai Moe, 2009. 73 Shah Paung, 2006. 74 Intelligence (April 2008), 2008. 75 Maung Aung Myoe, 2009, p. 77. 76 Moe Myint Tun, 2018. 77 အငယ်ဆံုးတိင ု ်းမFး စစ် ဦးစီ းအရာIှ ိ ချJပ် ြဖစ် လာ၊ ၂၀၁၇။ 78 Military source, personal communication, 2017. Min Aung Hlaing was the PSO to commander of Eastern RMC, General Maung Aye in Taunggyi, Shan State for two years. Moe Myint Tun was the PSO to deputy commander-in-chief General Maung Aye in 2005-2007. 79 Myanmar News Agency, 2021. 80 Acts Adopted, 2017. 81 One year on, no justice, 2016. 82 Myanmar declares martial law, 2017. 83 Military reshuffle, 2015. 84 The general staff officer post at the War Office was upgraded from colonel to brigadier general rank in 1988 (Maung Aung Myoe, 2009, p. 73). 85 Maung Aung Myoe, 2009. 86 Htet Naing Zaw, 2020. 87 Myanmar Economic Corporation is another military-managed economic organization. It is perhaps the most secretive business organization of the Tatmadaw (Maung Aung Myoe, 2009). 88 Maung Aung Myo, 2009; Mozur, 2018. 89 Former Tatmadaw officials, personal communications, 2017. 90 Current and former Tatmadaw officials, personal communications, 2017. 91 Former Tatmadaw officials, personal communications, 2017. 92 Poetranto, 2012. 93 Officer in the Public Relations and Psychological Warfare Department, personal communication, August 2018. 94 Tayninga Institute of Strategic Studies officials, personal communication, 2017. 95 Unspecified personal communications. 96 USDP official, personal communication, 2017. 97 Former Tatmadaw officials who received psychological warfare training, personal communications, 2017. 98 Unspecified personal communications. 99 Former high ranking military officer, personal communication, September 2018. 100 Unspecified personal communications. 101 Official working at psychological warfare department, personal communication, 2017. 102 Unspecified personal communication. 103 Village headman in Mrauk-U Township, personal communication, 2018. 104 MCN TV News Channel, 2019. 105 Phyo Wai, 2019. 106 Gov’t Accuses AA, 2019. 107 McLaughlin, et al., 2019. 108 Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, 2021. 109 Tatmadaw computer department official, personal interview, 2018. 110 The Committee for Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State with government officials chaired by then-Minister of Social Welfare, Reliefs and Resettlement Dr Win Myat Aye and the new Advisory Commission on Rakhine State chaired by Dr Surakiart Sathirathai, former deputy prime minister of Thailand. 111 Unspecified personal communications. 112 Unspecified personal communications. 113 Unspecified personal communications. 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