Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 Page ii Rohingya armed groups, meanwhile, have already started carrying out attacks on the Arakan Army in Rakhine State and are training fighters in camps along the border. Further intensification of this insurgency would cause great harm to all concerned – Rohingya civilians, the Arakan Army and Bangladesh. It would heighten the risk of further bloodshed between the Buddhist majority and Rohingya Muslim minority within Rakhine State, as well as increase the likelihood that more Rohingya will flee conflict across the border to Bangladesh. It would also make it more difficult for the Bangladeshi government to engage the Arakan Army, since the group believes that Dhaka is offering support to Rohingya armed groups. Given that the Arakan Army is now an inescapable interlocutor for any meaningful effort to repatriate the Rohingya living in Bangladesh, a breakdown in ties between it and the Bangladeshi government would represent a major setback to planning for the refugees’ return. Rohingya armed group attacks on the Arakan Army are also likely to shape the way the Rohingya are perceived in Myanmar and undermine their campaign to gain full rights, including citizenship, in the country. The Arakan Army has emerged as one of the junta’s most formidable opponents, boosting its appeal nationwide. Opposing it would put the Rohingya on the “wrong” side of the anti-military struggle in the eyes of many across Myanmar, damaging their prospects of gaining public acceptance, increasing the threat of persecution and undermining efforts at eventual reform of the country’s discriminatory citizenship law. Building trust among the three sides – the Arakan Army, the Rohingya and Bangladesh – will be crucial to averting a drift into further conflict. Bangladesh’s interim government should step up its dialogue with the Arakan Army as well as work to increase informal trade and humanitarian assistance to Rakhine State that could stabilise the border area by improving living conditions. Dhaka and its security agencies should also strive to contain the influence of Rohingya armed groups within the camps and create opportunities for civilian leadership to emerge. For its part, the Arakan Army should seek to demonstrate both to Bangladeshi authorities and Rohingya refugees that it can govern for all communities in Rakhine State and that it is willing to sit down in talks with the Rohingya minority to smooth over differences. With the U.S. axing much of its foreign aid, other international donors should minimise the impact on Bangladesh’s refugee camps in the knowledge that severe cuts will deepen the disillusionment and frustration among refugees that is already playing into the hands of the budding Rohingya insurgency. Cox’s Bazar/Dhaka/Brussels, 18 June 2025