Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 V. Page 21 The Way Forward Further conflict between Rohingya armed groups and the Arakan Army is in the interest of neither the Rohingya people, Bangladesh nor the Arakan Army. Given the Arakan Army’s military strength, armed struggle will not succeed in helping the Rohingya return to Rakhine State, and it could have devastating consequences, now that the Arakan Army in effect controls most of the areas where Rohingya remain and all the areas to which refugees would return. All parties should instead take steps to ensure that fighting does not escalate in northern Rakhine. Given that Rohingya armed groups are still building up their strength and the November truce appears to be fraying, there is an opportunity to reverse some of the dangerous pro-armed struggle rhetoric fuelling recruitment among Bangladesh’s refugee population. A. Bangladesh’s Approach While it has plenty of other issues to deal with as it rebuilds the country’s institutions and prepares for elections, Bangladesh’s interim government has a crucial role to play. It has already identified the Rohingya crisis as one of its top foreign policy challenges. After seven years of scant progress under Sheikh Hasina, and notwithstanding the challenges of recent months, the government has the chance to move the country closer to its goal of repatriating refugees. To do so, however, it will need to patiently build trust with the Arakan Army and develop a cohesive, coherent strategy involving all branches of the state. While Dhaka is not entirely comfortable negotiating with a non-state armed group – an area in which it lacks experience – and worries about the ramifications for its relationship with Naypyitaw, it has little choice given that Myanmar’s military regime is very unlikely to retake Rakhine or to be able to retaliate against Dhaka. In any case, Naypyitaw has grown accustomed to neighbouring states striking up dialogue with ethnic armed groups along their borders; China and Thailand have done so for decades, while India has followed suit more recently.112 With these facts in mind, Dhaka should continue to pursue dialogue with the Arakan Army, including discussions of provision of humanitarian assistance. Talking is important given not just the immensity of humanitarian need – including for the Rohingya still living in northern Rakhine – but also as a trust-building exercise. The Arakan Army is more likely to respond to incentives than the threat of an insurgency, and Bangladesh has much that it could offer, particularly in terms of cross-border aid and trade. Bangladesh will need to rethink its approach, however. To date, the interim government has been trying to establish a formal corridor, requiring the military regime’s approval. Given that Naypyitaw is blockading and bombing Arakan Army-controlled areas, it is very unlikely to agree; it may, however, wish to give the impression of supporting the initiative, so as not to antagonise Dhaka. Political parties in Bangladesh and the country’s army chief have also begun to speak out against the corridor 112 Crisis Group Briefing, A Rebel Border: India’s Evolving Ties with Myanmar after the Coup, op. cit.