Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency Crisis Group Asia Report N°348, 18 June 2025 Page 17 2021 of Mohib Ullah, leader of the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights, had a chilling effect. Since then, Bangladeshi security agencies have sponsored the creation of new Rohingya civil society organisations, but these have generally lacked legitimacy because refugees perceive them to be pushing the Bangladeshi government’s interests – that is, repatriation as soon as possible – rather than the community’s.98 The lack of organic civilian leadership in the refugee camps is a problem for Bangladesh. Dhaka has demanded that the Arakan Army engage with the Rohingya community, but the ethnic armed group has demurred on the grounds that it is unclear whom it should be talking with. This response may be disingenuous, but it does point to a real paucity of representation. Bangladesh is also keen to have civil society representatives at both the high-level UN conference on the Rohingya crisis planned for September and any preparatory events. While genuine civil society leaders do exist, they are reluctant to put themselves forward given the likely risks to their safety. The growing tendency of armed groups to depict the conflict in religious terms may also have harmful effects over the long term. It has already contributed to a paradigm shift among many refugees: as mentioned earlier, even those who do not support the current crop of Rohingya militants now see armed struggle as the only way forward. Given the size of the refugee population, this new attitude may pose security risks not only for the Arakan Army but also for Bangladesh. “Everyone from children to the elderly are now talking about jihad”, commented a Bangladeshi researcher who studies conflict in the camps.99 As armed groups become more influential, they will stifle more moderate voices in the camps and limit opportunities for dialogue with the Arakan Army. Bangladeshi security agencies also risk losing control of the armed groups, particularly if they establish themselves more firmly across the border with Myanmar. To some extent, ARSA appears to be moving back into Rakhine State, following the arrest of its leader Attaullah Abu Ammar Jununi (see Section III.A). B. Bangladesh’s Relations with the Arakan Army The Arakan Army’s perception that Bangladesh is allowing or even encouraging Rohingya armed groups to flourish undermines Dhaka’s efforts to engage with the group. The group’s leaders are already frustrated with Bangladeshi security agencies, believing they facilitated forced recruitment in the refugee camps in 2024 on the Myanmar military’s behalf.100 These tensions damaged trust and made it more difficult for Bangladesh’s interim government to initiate dialogue with the group after it took office. “Pitting Rohingya against the Arakan Army [in 2024] was a big mistake. If we were talking, it wouldn’t have happened”, said a former senior Bangladeshi diplomat.101 While Dhaka wants to continue its nascent dialogue with the Arakan Army, the activities of Rohingya armed groups are fuelling suspicion and hindering prospects 98 Crisis Group interviews, Rohingya refugees and humanitarian agency officials, June 2023. Crisis Group interview, Bangladeshi researcher, March 2025. 100 Crisis Group interviews, Arakan Army official, June 2024. 101 Crisis Group interview, former senior Bangladeshi diplomat, March 2025. 99