CONCLUSION After a year of dizzying gains, the Ma Ba Tha is entering a far more uncertain 2016. The November electoral outcome has come as a shock. The NLD landslide decimated the USDP, which had strongly allied itself with the Ma Ba Tha, and left no space for third-party candidates that had used religious nationalism as a central plank. The defeat is embarrassing to an organization whose key leaders had openly advocated against the NLD, but it may prove to have little material impact over the long run. To date, the Ma Ba Tha has proven itself to be an adaptive organization. It learned from the mistakes of the 969 and is continually evolving and professionalizing its messaging, activities, and narrative dissemination. Today, the Ma Ba Tha has built a strong foundation of highly active and motivated monks who oversee a vast network of ground activities and partnerships, as well as a powerful communications and lobbying apparatus, all with proven results. The Ma Ba Tha is likely to continue to retain a significant base of support because its messaging endorses a range of anti-Muslim prejudices that resonate in the broader Burmese society. Much of what is considered ‘ultra-nationalist’ in the international media is closer to ‘center-right’ in Myanmar, and core Ma Ba Tha issues such as the denial of rights for the Rohingya, enjoy popular mainstream support. No electoral outcome or new government can easily change these deep-rooted prejudices, but it is possible to better understand their core themes and develop better counter-messaging and early warning strategies. The Ma Ba Tha has articulated some clear ‘red lines’ for the incoming NLD government that could lead to confrontation. Chief among them is political opposition to ‘race and religion’ issues, particularly with any move to rescind or weaken the newly passed Race and Religion Laws. Meanwhile, the NLD is unlikely to forget the often-crude manner in which Ma Ba Tha followers slandered and defamed the party and its leadership in the run-up to elections, but the party has also shown an acute understanding of the Ma Ba Tha’s mobilizing power. Judging from recent history, despite its unambiguous political mandate, it is not clear if the NLD is willing to expend the political capital that will be required to confront the Ma Ba Tha and curb its anti-Muslim messaging and activities. On net assessment, the Ma Ba Tha is likely to remain a powerful force in Myanmar’s politics for some time to come. Furthermore, the organization is likely to remain centered around the guiding principles of its key personalities, which currently consist of anti-Muslim monks, such as Ashin Wirathu, Ashin Wimala, Ashin Parmoukkha, and other charismatic junior monks who are currently driving the message and overseeing Central Committee activities.. Several years of tolerance for their activities has made them powerful actors in their own right, but a concerted push by Myanmar’s government and senior and more measured members of the Sangha could begin to curb their excesses. 43