Enablers The Ma Ba Tha’s astronomic rise has not occurred on its own; a series of political and civil society groups have enabled its growth. In particular, the freedom with which the Ma Ba Tha’s Central Committee and regional chapters have been allowed to operate in comparison to other nongovernmental groups has suggested at least some level of collusion with the USDP-led government. 298 Meanwhile, the Ma Ba Tha’s apparent might has cowed opposition and pro-human rights political groups and activists, including for a while, seemingly even the NLD, as will be discussed. The Ma Ba Tha’s political involvement appears to have grown through 2015, especially after the June 2015 Second Annual Convention, when the Central Committee issued a directive that urged its chapters to ‘guide the people in electing a “reliable MP” for the Ma Ba Tha’s cause,’ as one of its four key points, according to a copy of the directive posted on social media.299 Since then, as discussed below, the Ma Ba Tha has fairly overtly allied and associated itself with a series of small, ultra-nationalist political parties and activist groups, going as far as co-hosting events and actively disseminating these groups’ content on Ma Ba Tha channels, and vice versa. 300 301 302 303 The November 2015 landslide NLD electoral victory with 77 percent304 of the votes was a crushing defeat for the Ma Ba Tha allied candidates, nearly all of whom lost. These results have clearly come as a surprise to the Ma Ba Tha, which appeared to have been expecting much stronger results by the political parties it had implicitly endorsed.305 306 The extent of this defeat has raised questions on the true depth of Ma Ba Tha support; additionally, as Walton states, the Ma Ba Tha has been clearly chastened after the elections, but it remains to be seen if it will suffer any consequential effects.307 A large degree of the Ma Ba Tha’s appeal derives from the simple fact that its core narratives on ‘race and religion’ resonate broadly across mainstream society, even among NLD supporters. 308 Prominent individuals across politics, the government, civil society, and even pro-democracy civil rights leader have agreed with and repeated various anti-Muslim narratives, particularly those involving the denial of basic rights for the Rohingya, as seen below. The following are some examples: • USDP Religious Affairs Minister Sann Sint (2013): “Wirathu’s sermons are about promoting love and understanding between religions. It is impossible he is inciting religious violence.”309 • USDP Information Minister Ye Htut (2015): “We will not register it, if a household wants to identify themselves as Rohingya.”310 • Rakhine State Government Spokesman Win Myaing (2013): “How can it be ethnic cleansing? They are not an ethnic group.311 • Rakhine Politician & Chairman of Arakan National Party Aye Maung (2013): “We don't have Rohingya's in our country. We can only say that they are Bangladeshi or foreign Bengalis.” 312 • 88 Generation Peace and Open Society Group Leader and prominent pro-democracy activist Ko Ko Gyi: “I will resign from this commission if it uses the word ‘human rights’ in association with these Bengali.”313 • Member of Presidential Inquiry Commission on the Rakhine Sectarian Violence Commission, Dr. Yin Yin New: “These un-educated Bengali women procreate like mad […] Because of this population explosion, now 90-plus percent of Buthidaung and Maungdaw is made up of Bengali and only about 5-6 percent are Rakhine. So think for yourself who is a majority here and who is a minority. That is why, we proposed population control – albeit on a voluntary basis”314 34