Ashin Tiloka instructs readers that, “There are precedents where helping those who aren’t worthy for compassion have led to the demise of race and religion such as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines and Rakhine State.”91 This sentiment is quite strongly reciprocated by supporters. As voiced by a major Thai donor to the Ma Ba Tha, “We need to have monks like Wirathu. About 80 percent of monks only act according to tradition; sometimes we need fighter monks.”92 This viewpoint is also prominently reflected in online discourse. One of the most common “memes” seen in the comments of nationalist posts is an image that shows a man armed with a club (likely taken from the Grand Theft Auto video game series), as seen in the image on the right in the previous page. The overlaid text states, “For I am a Burmese Buddhist, I’ll be rude and rough were my race and religion threatened.” Image 12: Popular meme with the caption “For I am a Burmese Buddhist, I’ll be rude and rough were my race and religion threatened.” Illegal Immigration Many Burmese present the Rohingya issue as primarily one of illegal immigration. This belief is not unique to the Ma Ba Tha, or even the nationalist-right. The status of Rohingya Muslims as citizens of Myanmar, or as one of the recognized ethnic groups, is bitterly contested. Ye Htut, the government spokesman and current Information Minister, summarized the prevailing line in 2013, “We have said this many times, that Myanmar has never had a Rohingya ethnicity … there are no documents about them in history or in any census taken since the British era.”93 However, the Ma Ba Tha and ultranationalists go one step further in presenting the illegal immigration issue as an existential demographic threat that will erode the Buddhist majority in the country. Ma Ba Tha monks regularly refer to Maungdaw, a township near the border with Bangladesh in Rakhine State and one of the few Muslim-majority areas in Myanmar, as an example of Buddhists becoming minorities in their own homeland. This notion of a Muslim invasion is far from new and has long been a theme in the Burmese political thought; in fact, Arakan State is referred to as the “Western Gate,” or the frontline, between Buddhist Myanmar and Muslim Bangladesh. This reference is regularly used by Rakhine politicians, including in 2013, when they called for the implementation of Rakhine militia patrol units near the border against the ‘illegal Bengalis.’94 The Ma Ba Tha does not accept the word “Rohingya” in Burmese, generally substituting it with “Bengali.” However, the Central Committee goes beyond mere denial by attempting to provide legal, historical, and religious background for its position. The Central Committee has issued several statements to explain and clarify their position on the issue. One statement in January 2015 was released on Facebook in English to address an international audience. It stated that, “there were no nomenclature of the Rohingya in the Myanmar ethnic groups throughout the successive ages of history at all. There also had one firm opinion remark as they were Bengali trespassers which was proclaimed by the embassy of the England… in December 23rd 1975.”95 Beyond statements, the Ma Ba Tha has organized and supported rallies against the “boat people.” For example, a Yangon rally in May 201596was organized by the Ha Pyar Za (Golden Pagoda) organization,97 which has a large number of affiliated groups, including the Myanmar National Network and Rakhine youth groups. Images of the event posted on MNN social media show the attendance of senior Ma Ba Tha monks, including Ashin Parmoukkha.98 16