particularly expression that has political and ideological messages. There is largely a lack of distinction within the laws about expression online and offline – for instance, the national security and terrorism-related laws, which have been applied in multiple cases on online speech, do not include a chalked-out distinction between the medium used to express. However, while the traditional laws have been applied online, the cybercrime law does include criminal penalties for expression that is exclusively shared online – in some instances these penalties do not apply or differ from penalties defined for similar expression in the offline sphere. In addition to the laws that criminalise expression, there are three major points of concern with regard to the way these laws are being implemented and framed for the general public. First, there is a complete lack of transparency and clarity when it comes to application of online censorship clauses included within the cybercrime law, which also makes it difficult for general internet users to ascertain how the PTA and FIA are interpreting the provisions of PECA. PECA includes certain clauses that do not directly criminalise expression but define the general environment within which freedom of expression online is to be exercised – for example, real-time surveillance and data collection clauses. With regard to these sections, which can potentially be invasive and restrictive of the practice of freedom of expression, there is a contradiction between the Ministry of IT and the investigative agency FIA: while the Ministry continues to hold that the country’s security and intelligence agencies have no role in the implementation of these sections, the civil investigative agency representatives openly admit that the role of agencies in real-time surveillance is much higher than their own. The section itself is framed in reference to another law – the Investigation for Fair Trial Act – that legitimises the role of intelligence agencies in real-time digital surveillance in addition to the designated FIA. Second, there is a structured campaign on the part of the government to link online expression to blasphemy and anti-state activities. More alarming than the actual legislation perhaps is the narrative being built by different state institutions to justify an increase in the crackdown against activists and journalists who frequently turn to the online sphere. As demonstrated in this report, both civil and military authorities have increasingly referred to the “dangers” that “anti-national and anti-state” elements online pose to the country. This narrative, supported by strong propaganda tools, has been internalised by a significant populace and it is common to see violent reactions towards freedom of expression advocates. Social media, whenever mentioned by cabinet members and government parliamentarians during their media talks and briefs, is referred to as a tool for creating instability, a means of spreading anti-Islam and anti-state messages. In the same vein, the people who are vocal online, particularly those who openly protest and demonstrate against crackdowns on online freedom of expression, are framed as anti-state elements who do not have religious and moral grounding. Finally, the prevalence of “mob justice” by rightwing elements who feel offended and threatened by religiously provocative speech is increasing. The government has failed to offer protection and justice and remains complicit even in cases where it was proven that the violence done in the name of blasphemy was deliberately provoked by the authorities. The case of Mashal Khan’s murder is reflective of this brewing trend. At this stage it is very clear that the administration of Mardan University was involved in provoking the violence against their own student,58 some of the screenshots used by the members of the mob to call him a blasphemer were fake, and the murder and subsequent mutilation of his body itself is obviously a heinous crime. And yet, political parties within the government were not only reluctant to take action against this brutality, but some right-wing parties actively tried to rile up the public sentiment further by connecting murder investigations with possible amendments in the blasphemy law.59 Before the murder, a structured campaign against the bloggers who faced enforced disappearances and the activists who demonstrated for their recovery showed very clearly that state functionaries and their cronies with the media are willing and able to use the “blasphemy card” to taint even political speech in the eyes of the general public, thus creating an environment where people fear mob justice and retreat from their online spaces – and when this happens, the most regressive ways of evoking the criminalisation laws are not even necessary. 58 Akbar, A. (2017, 17 April). Lynching suspect gives statement: “University administration asked me to testify against Mashal”. Dawn.com. https://www.dawn.com/news/1327576 59 The Nation. (2017, 1 May). “Will cut tongue of anyone wanting to change blasphemy law,” says Jamaat-e-Islami KP chief. The Nation. nation.com.pk/national/01-May-2017/will-cut-tongue-of-anyonewanting-to-change-blasphemy-law-says-jamaat-e-islami-kp-chief PAKISTAN / 117