Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield Crisis Group Asia Report N°314, 18 May 2021 Page 31 VI. Conclusion The 1 February coup has turned Myanmar’s online sphere into a key battleground for both the military regime and its opponents. Although the Tatmadaw has sought to build its digital capabilities over the years, it was not prepared to tackle such strong and widespread opposition to military rule. Protest organisers, NLD politicians and leaders of the civil disobedience movement have used social media and other applications highly effectively to organise demonstrations and undertake activities to undermine the regime. Meanwhile, Facebook’s decision to ban the military from the country’s most popular social media platform has significantly disrupted its ability to communicate with the public or even its own soldiers. Reflecting the difficulty it faces in controlling Myanmar’s population after a decade of liberalisation, the only way the military has found to wage this online fight is to shut down the internet. The economic and social cost of such a decision is enormous, crippling businesses and nurturing even stronger resentment toward the military. Lack of internet access also impairs the regime’s ability to govern, as well as communicate with its own base. Yet any relaxation of internet restrictions is likely to re-energise the protest movement by enabling activists to once again coordinate and share information. To overcome this contradiction, the junta appears to be taking the first steps toward developing a national intranet, in which most users will have access to just a handful of vetted applications. While an intranet may appear to be a short-term solution, it will stifle innovation, access to information and economic growth, and tech-savvy users are likely to find loopholes and gain access to the worldwide web. Foreign governments, technology firms and businesses operating within the country should push back strongly against internet restrictions, which are a violation of the fundamental rights of the people of Myanmar. Foreign technology companies can and should take steps to help keep the internet as open as possible and protect users from the regime, particularly by making VPNs more widely available, and improving digital security knowledge. Foreign governments should, for their part, strengthen arms embargoes to include “dual-use” equipment and software that can be used by the regime to target opponents and enforce such embargoes properly. Yangon/Brussels, 18 May 2021