Principal Findings What’s new? After first trying to restrict internet use by banning social media platforms, enacting legal changes and ordering night-time outages, the Myanmar military has shut down nearly all access to the web in the wake of the 1 February coup d’état and started establishing a countrywide intranet with limited services. Why did it happen? The military was losing the online battle and felt it had few options. Activists have used social media platforms – particularly Facebook – highly effectively to organise protests, galvanise the public and document abuses, while the military has been banned from Facebook altogether, limiting its outreach abilities. Why does it matter? The internet shutdown has undermined the opposition movement – particularly its ability to organise street protests – but at huge social and economic cost. The military faces a long-term strategic challenge in managing internet use as it seeks to consolidate power in the coup’s wake. What should be done? Technology companies should help keep Myanmar’s online space as open and safe as possible, particularly by expanding free access to secure virtual private networks. Foreign governments should embargo “dualuse” items that can be used for repressive purposes, including software, and strengthen enforcement by better policing sales made through middlemen.