Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield Crisis Group Asia Report N°314, 18 May 2021 B. Page 8 The State Fights Back In other circumstances, the Arakan Army’s reliance on civilian communication channels could have been a major weakness and provided the Tatmadaw with a significant amount of intelligence. But the Myanmar military had seemingly very limited capacity to harvest information from telephone calls, social media and unencrypted communications. Indeed, Arakan Army members and supporters often used unencrypted applications, even with the government-owned operator MPT.31 To disrupt enemy communication channels, the government and military were instead compelled to restrict access to the internet.32 The internet restrictions in Rakhine were among the longest-running anywhere in the world. In June 2019, the government’s ministry of transport and communications, at the Tatmadaw’s request, ordered mobile operators to stop internet access in eight townships in Rakhine State as well as Paletwa township in neighbouring Chin State. Access was restored in five townships in August 2019, before being interrupted again the following February, and then lifted in one township, Maungdaw, in May 2020. At the start of August 2020, the government permitted a resumption of 2G internet access in all areas, but in practice little changed, as it is difficult to perform even the most basic web-based functions on such low-speed connections.33 Full internet access was restored on 3 February 2021, two days after the coup, but restricted again on 15 March all over the country (see Section IV.B below).34 The primary purpose of the mobile internet ban was to disrupt Arakan Army operations, including command and control and intelligence gathering. Undermining the insurgency’s ability to spread propaganda, and minimising the flow of information about events on the ground – including the Tatmadaw’s alleged human rights abuses – were likely secondary goals.35 The strategy proved mostly effective in achieving Naypyitaw’s key goal: the Arakan Army could no longer rely on common internet applications for command and control in most areas in which it operates, which was likely one of the reasons the group gradually staged fewer large-scale offensives from the second half of 2019.36 The ban also made it more difficult for its supporters to provide the group with intelligence, particularly GPS locations of government forces, 31 Myanmar has four mobile operators: MPT, Telenor, Ooredoo and Mytel. Many Rakhine users eschew Mytel because it is a military-owned joint venture, and Ooredoo because it is owned by a firm from Qatar, a majority-Muslim country. Crisis Group interviews, October and November 2020. 32 Crisis Group interview, conflict researcher, November 2020. Had the Arakan Army been relying on encrypted communications only, the government could have asked mobile operators to switch off those particular applications. 33 “Rakhine, Chin internet restored, but only 2G”, Myanmar Times, 7 August 2020; and “Continued network restrictions in Myanmar from 1 August 2020 (updated 31 October 2020)”, Telenor. 34 The restoration of internet in Rakhine came following months of negotiations between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army, and the decision of the Arakan National Party, the state’s leading political party, to work with the military regime. See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°164, From Elections to Ceasefire in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, 23 December 2020; and “Network restored in eight townships in Myanmar”, Telenor, 3 February 2021. 35 Crisis Group interviews, Rakhine State resident and political analyst, October 2020; conflict researcher, November 2020. 36 Crisis Group interview, conflict researcher, November 2020.