Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield Crisis Group Asia Report N°314, 18 May 2021 Page 17 committing a range of abuses against unarmed civilians. Not only did this footage provide evidence of what was happening on the ground, but it also strengthened domestic and international opinion against the military regime.76 Recognising it was losing the online battle, the military on 15 March ordered the total shutdown of mobile internet services, which constitute the main source of access to the web for the vast majority of users in Myanmar. Two days later it shut down public wi-fi services, and from 2 April instructed mobile operators and internet service providers to also halt fixed wireless services, which many urban households use for home connections. Only the much less common fibre-to-the-home connections remained operational, leaving rural areas completely disconnected.77 In urban areas, service providers have been inundated with applications for fibre connections, and are unable to meet demand. In the meantime, many residents are sharing connections with neighbours who have fibre to get around the blackout. But by one estimate, there are likely just 600,000 active internet connections left in the country – barely one for every 100 people – down from close to 25 million prior to the mobile data shutdown.78 A factor that may have influenced the military’s thinking in taking this draconian step is its forces’ morale. The majority of military personnel and their families live in cantonments, and anecdotal evidence suggests that many have not been allowed off base since the last week of January. Some sources indicate that a desire to stop information about events unfolding across the country from reaching rank-and-file soldiers played a role in the Tatmadaw’s decision to shut down mobile internet.79 They now have little choice but to rely on state media for information, with the 8pm nightly news often compulsory viewing.80 The mobile, public wi-fi and fixed wireless internet shutdowns have had a discernible impact on the opposition movement. The organisational networks of the civil disobedience and protest movements have been significantly affected. “The impact of losing most communication channels has been very noticeable. Two weeks after losing fixed wireless access, there are some people who are still completely offline”, commented one civil society leader.81 The volume of user-generated content on social media about what is happening inside the country has also diminished significantly. In some regional cities, protests stopped almost immediately because activists were unable to organise; coordination in rural areas, which have been almost entirely cut off, has been even more affected. Underscoring how limited con76 The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, which was established by the UN Human Rights Council to gather and store evidence of Tatmadaw abuses against minorities, has been looking into possible crimes against humanity by the military since the coup. See “Human Rights Council reiterates urgent need to ensure accountability in Myanmar”, Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, 24 March 2021. 77 See, for example, “‘Any news from the internet?’: Fear and rumour in villages forced offline”, Frontier Myanmar, 10 April 2021. 78 “Myanmar shutdown of wireless internet fuels fears of news blackout”, Nikkei Asia, 2 April 2021; and “Digital 2021: Myanmar”, op. cit. 79 “Inside Myanmar’s army: ‘They see protesters as criminals’”, The New York Times, 28 March 2021. 80 Crisis Group interviews, social media and digital security researchers, March 2021. 81 Crisis Group interview, civil society leader, April 2021.