Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield Crisis Group Asia Report N°314, 18 May 2021 Page 9 reducing the risk that the troops would be ambushed. Finally, the internet ban diminished the amount of user-generated Facebook content about the conflict. But a range of factors also limited the impact of the internet restrictions. On an operational level, the Arakan Army increased its use of satellite phones for command and control.37 Because voice calls and SMS were not restricted, these services could still be used by the group’s network of members and supporters on the ground to both send intelligence about Tatmadaw troop movements and disseminate information to communities.38 Internet access was also not completely severed. Fibrebased connections remained available in several towns in the blackout zone, such as Mrauk-U, and it was often still possible to get a 3G signal in elevated areas.39 After 2G was restored, those living in areas with unrestricted internet would copy and paste the text of news reports and share them on Facebook groups so that they could be read even with a slow connection.40 Journalists and civil society groups were able to send information by telephone to contacts who could post online, or travel to areas with internet access to upload it directly.41 Human rights violations were also still widely documented in mainstream and social media. Later, at the military’s request, Aung San Suu Kyi’s government also re-introduced nationwide website filtering, almost a decade after such censorship had been lifted. In March 2020, the ministry of transport and communications ordered mobile operators and internet service providers to block access to 2,147 websites. Although the vast majority of these were either pornographic or part of an Interpol blacklist related to child sexual abuse, the list also included 67 sites that the government claimed were spreading “fake news”.42 Among the sites blocked were the Arakan Army’s page and two Rakhine-based media organisations, Development Media Group and Narinjara. This measure was not particularly effective, either: both of these organisations’ output could still be read on Facebook, which is where most people in Myanmar go for news, while information from the Arakan Army website is shared on social media by users outside Myanmar or who view the group’s website inside the country using a virtual private network (VPN). The consequences of the mobile internet ban for the Rakhine population in blackedout communities have been significant, however. The blackout has had a negative social and economic impact on those communities, making it difficult to conduct 37 Crisis Group interviews, Rakhine political analyst, October 2020; conflict researcher, November 2020. In September 2019, a few months after the internet ban was introduced, authorities in Mandalay arrested five alleged Arakan Army members with 40 satellite phones, high-powered binoculars and suspected bomb-making equipment. See “Mandalay on alert against Arakan Army operatives”, Myanmar Times, 18 September 2019. 38 Crisis Group interview, Rakhine politician close to the Arakan Army, November 2020. 39 “Annual Peace and Security Review 2020”, op. cit., p. 96. 40 Crisis Group interview, Rakhine politician close to Arakan Army, October 2020. 41 Although the quantity of information emerging from Rakhine State likely declined, a Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security study found only a slight effect on the speed with which civilian fatalities and injuries were publicly reported. See “Annual Peace and Security Review 2020”, op. cit., p. 95. 42 “Myanmar orders dozens of news websites blocked in crackdown on ‘fake news’”, Committee to Protect Journalists, 2 April 2020; and “Myanmar blocks ‘fake news’ websites amid COVID-19 pandemic”, Ooni, 6 May 2020.