Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield Crisis Group Asia Report N°314, 18 May 2021 Page 6 Despite the longstanding grievances, emerging tensions and growing evidence of a strengthening Arakan Army presence in Rakhine State, the government and Tatmadaw were ill prepared when the group landed its first major blow. On 4 January 2019 – Myanmar’s Independence Day – Arakan Army forces staged coordinated attacks on Border Guard Police posts, killing thirteen officers and injuring nine others. Naypyitaw responded swiftly, with the civilian administration ordering the military to undertake “clearance operations” to “crush” the insurgent group, which now controlled somewhere from 5,000 to 10,000 troops.21 Over the next two years, the fighting in Rakhine and southern Chin States was the fiercest Myanmar had experienced in decades, with thousands of combatants and civilians killed, and hundreds of thousands displaced.22 Mobile internet and social media continued to be important tools for the Arakan Army once conflict escalated in January 2019. It used them for operational purposes, for command and control, and to gather intelligence, as well as to solicit donations and to recruit. In the early stages of the conflict, the group relied on mobile internet and common messaging applications to stage mass offensives, as well as highly effective ambushes of Tatmadaw units. The armed group used these tools to receive intelligence from civilians – principally, the location of government forces – and to coordinate its combatants. The Arakan Army also relied on the internet and social media to help it reach its objective of dismantling the government administration across much of central and northern Rakhine State. To this end, the group used social media to publicly threaten “traitors” and issue warnings to local government officials, including police officers, backing up these threats with targeted killings. Fear of the Arakan Army – or alternatively of being detained by the Tatmadaw as an insurgency collaborator – prompted many local officials to resign, directly leading to the administrative breakdown.23 In an attempt to build up its legitimacy, the Arakan Army then used official statements and social media posts to position itself as the de facto governing authority in these areas.24 The Arakan Army continued to use social media throughout the conflict but Facebook’s decision, in February 2019, to ban it from its platform for being a “dangerous organisation” has had a significant impact on its capacity to communicate online.25 21 Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°154, A New Dimension of Violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, 24 January 2019. 22 Total casualties are not known but are thought to number in the thousands; the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security estimates that between 934 and 1,711 combatants were killed in 2019 alone. See “Annual Peace and Security Review 2020”, Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security, p. 12. Civil society groups estimate that more than 220,000 people were displaced and almost 300 civilians killed. See “Five Rohingya killed in shooting incidents in Myanmar’s Rakhine State”, Radio Free Asia, 6 October 2020. 23 Crisis Group interview, social media researcher, November 2020. 24 Ibid. 25 On 5 February 2019, Facebook announced that it was banning the Arakan Army and three other armed groups, collectively known as the Northern Alliance, from its platform in “an effort to prevent and disrupt offline harm”, stating there was “clear evidence that these organizations have been responsible for attacks against civilians and have engaged in violence in Myanmar”. See “Banning More Dangerous Organizations from Facebook in Myanmar”, Facebook, 5 February 2019.