Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield Crisis Group Asia Report N°314, 18 May 2021 II. Page 4 Rakhine: A Test Run for Repression Many of the approaches that the military has employed to try to control the online world since the 1 February coup were tested during an earlier conflict, when it waged a bloody war against the insurgent Arakan Army in central and northern Rakhine State in 2019-2020. During that period, the Tatmadaw witnessed for the first time how its opponents could use social media to devastating effect if given the opportunity. After almost a decade of unfettered internet access across the country, it urged the National League for Democracy (NLD) government to order internet shutdowns and website filtering in order to undermine the insurgency’s operations. The conflict gave the Tatmadaw insights into the impact of these restrictions, the technological challenges linked to controlling online content and the domestic and international response it could expect when resorting to such measures. A. The Arakan Army: Sowing the Seeds of an Insurgency Among Myanmar’s many armed groups, the Arakan Army, which seeks greater rights and autonomy for the Rakhine Buddhist community, has harnessed the country’s new online space to greatest effect since its founding in 2009. At first, the group employed traditional techniques, such as newsletters and word-of-mouth campaigns, to build support and recruit.13 But as it grew in strength and began quietly shifting forces from its base in Kachin State to Rakhine State from 2014, its young leaders – particularly its charismatic chairman Twan Mrat Naing, a former tour guide – started pushing out relatively sophisticated posts and videos on social media. These outlined their vision for self-determination, which they called “The Way of Rakhita”, labelled the Tatmadaw and Myanmar government “invaders”, and promised to lift the yoke of Burman oppression from Rakhine State and restore it to its former glories. Deputy commander Nyo Twan Awng became a popular presence on Facebook from around 2016, attracting thousands of followers with posts about the group’s activities and the political situation in Rakhine State.14 The Arakan Army’s use of social media was not limited to propaganda. The group also used Facebook to solicit donations and recruits during these formative years (and has continued to do so). It selected the most effective platforms for reaching different audiences, whether that was WeChat to recruit young Rakhine near the Chinese border or WhatsApp to send statements to journalists.15 While its leaders crafted engaging social media posts, the group issued formal statements in multiple languages, including Chinese, and created high-quality videos for YouTube. Later, its 13 Crisis Group interview, conflict researcher, November 2020. Much of this content has disappeared and does not appear to have been preserved after Facebook banned the Arakan Army and several other ethnic armed groups from its platform in February 2019. Some of it, however, remains accessible on YouTube, including an English-language video from early 2018, “The Way of Rakhita”, that has amassed more than two million views. For further discussion of the use of social media by the Arakan Army and other ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, see Stein Tønnesson, Min Zaw Oo and Ne Lynn Aung, “Pretending to be States: The Use of Facebook by Armed Groups in Myanmar”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 4 May 2021. 15 Crisis Group interview, conflict researcher, November 2020. 14