Myanmar: Human Rights Analysis of Biometric Digital ID Systems entitlements, this may not serve the best interests of the poorest and most vulnerable. The UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights has commented extensively on the potential risks of a digital welfare system: First, the process for determining eligibility may easily be transformed into an electronic questionand-answer process that almost inevitably puts already vulnerable individuals at even greater disadvantage. Second, the way in which determinations are framed and communicated may be dehumanized and allow no room for meaningful questioning or clarification. Third, the digital welfare state often seems to involve various forms of rigidity and the robotic application of rules. As a result, extenuating circumstances . . . are often not taken into account in a predominantly digital context. Fourth, digital systems are often not designed to respond rapidly either to serious emergencies or to daily challenges, such as those that may be experienced by an older person whose entitlement has suddenly and inexplicably been electronically reduced or cancelled or by a single parent unable to take a child to a local day care because the digital identification card will not function. Fifth, the ways in which services are provided can easily have degrading connotations, such as unnecessarily exposure to a broader audience the fact that a person is reliant on benefits, or requiring extended waiting periods or the navigation of lengthy queues. Sixth, the introduction of various new technologies that eliminate the human provider can enhance efficiency and provide other advantages but might not necessarily be satisfactory for individuals who are in situations of particular vulnerability. New technologies often operate on the law of averages, in the interests of majorities and on the basis of predicted outcomes or likelihoods.33 2. Digital ID Developments in Myanmar 2.1 Legal Framework Article 357 of Myanmar’s Constitution provides for the protection of “privacy and security of home, property, correspondence and other communications of citizens under the law”, subject to other constitutional provisions.34 Myanmar’s 2017 Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens also sets out protections for the privacy and security of communications.35 Specifically, in addition to affirming the constitutional right to privacy, it places a general obligation on authorities to protect privacy (Article 4) and prohibits them from entering private residences, conducting surveillance, intercepting communications, obtaining telephonic or electronic communications and other similar activities without prior authorisation (Article 8). 33 Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, note 14, paras. 54-59. English translation available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Myanmar_2008.pdf?lang=en. 35 Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, 8 March 2017. Available in English at: https://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/pdf/Law-Protecting-Privacy-and-Security-ofCitizens_en_unofficial.pdf. 34 -7-