2.6. Telegram In contrast to the aforementioned platforms, Telegram operates with a significantly leaner policy framework, creating a notable gap in protection. • Terms of Service and Privacy Policy: Telegram’s moderation is limited to “illegal public content” in public channels, with a zero-sharing policy with governments. It prohibits promoting violence but lacks any specific framework for protecting journalists or documenting human rights. • Ads Policy (Section 5.5): Explicitly prohibits ads related to political campaigns, elections, or candidates, stating that ads related to “sensitive topics” can be suspended. The discrepancy between the high-level policy commitments made by all the digital platforms and their practical application forms the core of the media's struggle. While platforms promise protection and due diligence on paper, the reality on the ground during the election period was one of profound insecurity. 3. A climate of fear and the reality of digital threats The 2025-6 election cycle intensified a climate of fear where digital threats facilitated real-world violence. 86% of the media reported specific instances of intimidation and attacks online. For Myanmar’s media, the online and offline worlds are inextricably intertwined. Digital surveillance and online harassment are inseparable from the encouragement or facilitation of offline harms. A threat made in an online comment section could be a precursor to offline violence. Even if the threat did not materialise offline, psychological and operational harm was done. 86% of the media reported attacks online during the election period 3.1. The risks of operating simultaneously in exile and inside The media faces a violation of the right to seek and impart information on several fronts. While Myanmar’s independent media outlets are often described as exile media, the term is a misnomer. While headquartered abroad, these outlets remain operationally reliant on staff, journalists, and sources inside Myanmar who face constant risk. Page 9 of 19