“Crashing Down on Us” 67 The airstrikes and other attacks documented in this report were likely under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Myanmar Air Force, Bureau of Special Operations (BSO) 1 and 2, Northern and Eastern Regional Military Command (RMC) in Myitkyina and Taunggyi respectively, Regional Operations Command (ROC) in Tanai and Loikaw, and Military Operation Command (MOC) 21 in Bhamo, Kachin State, and 7 in Pekon, Shan State. The commanders of the Northern RMC, Tanai ROC, and MOC-21 are responsible for all of the military operations in Kachin State, and the commanders of Eastern RMC, Loikaw ROC, and MOC-7 are responsible for all of the military operations in Karenni State. BSOs are at the top of regional command structures and have overall control of the RMCs, ROCs, MOCs, and LIDs below them.212 Airstrikes documented in this report were carried out using aircraft deployed from multiple Myanmar Air Force bases. The airbases directly linked to strikes in Kachin and Karenni states include: Mingaladon Airbase Headquarters, Shante Aviation Training Airbase Headquarters, Myitkyina Airbase Headquarters (Nampong Airbase), Namsang Airbase Headquarters, Taungoo Airbase Headquarters, Magway Airbase Headquarters, Tada-U Airbase, Hmawbi Airbase, Naypyidaw Airbase, Meiktila Ground Operations Airbase Headquarters, and two Aircraft Maintenance and Production Headquarters in Mingaladon and Shante. These airbases are under the command of the Air Force’s central leadership and are strategically positioned to support joint operations in northern and eastern Myanmar.213 KIA Colonel Naw Bu, speaking to Fortify Rights, confirmed the use of some of these facilities, stating: “Myitkyina and Tada-U [Myanmar Air Force base near Mandalay] are the places where most military jets depart to launch airstrikes when there are [sic] fighting.”214 The artillery attacks toward Laiza and its surroundings may have been conducted by the nearby military outposts in Bumre Bum, Hpun Pyen Bum, Hkaya Bum, and Na Hpaw Bum, as well as Light Infantry Division-LID (TaMaKha) 88, Infantry Battalion-IB (KhaLaYa) 142 located in Dawphumyang (Hangkai Bum), and Infantry Battalion-IB (KhaLaYa) 321 in Shwe Nyaung Pin. The KIA believes that the Myanmar junta’s shelling on Laiza on November 8, 2023, was from IB-321 and launched from the Shwe Nyaung Pin military post on the Myitkyina-Bhamo road. Leaked internal documents of the Myanmar military on file with Fortify Rights provide information on ten infantry battalions under the control of MOC-21. The nearest battalions to Laiza are based in Myo Thit, Tarsai, and Num Lung. LIB (KhaMaYa) 320 and 387 are based in Myo Thit, about 57 kilometers away from Laiza. KhaLaYa (IB) 237 is based in Tarsai and KhaMaYa (LIB) 438 is in Num Lung.215 In Karenni State, a military source provided Fortify Rights with information about five military units operating under the Eastern Regional Military Command, the Regional Operations Command, and Military Operations Command-7. Under the Regional Operations Command based in Loikaw is Infantry Battalion (IB) 54. Under Military Operations Command-7, there are four units: Infantry Battalion (IB) 250 and Infantry Battalion (IB) 261 in Loikaw, Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 427 in Ngwe Taung, and Infantry Battalion (IB) 102 in Demoso. All commands are overseen by the Eastern Regional Military Command.216 212 Myanmar Military Confidential Documents on file with Fortify Rights, August 2022. Fortify Rights communication with B.C., undisclosed location, November 23, 2023. 213 Fortify Rights communication with Myanmar Defense & Security Institute, July and August 2025. See also, Centre for Information Resilience (Myanmar Witness), Myanmar Witness Guides-Airbases; Myanmar Defense & Security Institute, Changes in the Junta’s Air Force Command and Air Operations Strategy. 214 Fortify Rights interview with B.H., Laiza, Waingmaw Township, Kachin State, Myanmar, November 5, 2023. 215 Myanmar Military Confidential Documents on file with Fortify Rights, August 2022. See also, “မြ�န််မာာစစ််တပ််ကိုု� ခွဲဲ�ခြ�မ်းး�စိိတ််ဖြာ�ာခြ�င်းး� အပိုု�င်းး� (၁) [Analysis of Myanmar Military (1)],” The Irrawaddy, June 22, 2023, https://burma.irrawaddy. com/article/2023/06/22/335712.html; “မြ�န််မာာစစ််တပ််ကိုုခွဲဲ�ခြ�မ်းး � �စိိတ််ဖြာ�ာခြ�င်းး� အပိုု�င်းး� (၂) [Analysis of Myanmar Military (2)],” The Irrawaddy, June 26, 2023, https://burma.irrawaddy.com/article/2023/06/26/335786.html; “မြ�န််မာာစစ််တပ််ကိုုခွဲဲ�ခြ�မ်းး � �စိိတ််ဖြာ�ာ ခြ�င်းး� အပိုု�င်းး� (၃) [Analysis of Myanmar Military (3)],” The Irrawaddy, June 29, 2023, https://burma.irrawaddy.com/ article/2023/06/29/335915.html. 216 Fortify Rights communication with B.C., undisclosed location, November 23, 2024. See also, “မြ�န််မာာစစ််တပ်ကိုု ် � ခွဲဲ�ခြ�မ်းး�စိိတ််ဖြာ�ာခြ�င်းး� အပိုု�င်းး� (၁) [Analysis of Myanmar Military (1)],” The Irrawaddy; “မြ�န််မာာစစ််တပ်ကိုု ် � ခွဲဲ�ခြ�မ်းး�စိိတ််ဖြာ�ာခြ�င်းး� အပိုု�င်းး� (၂) [Analysis of Myanmar Military (2)],” The Irrawaddy; “မြ�န််မာာစစ််တပ်ကိုု ် � ခွဲဲ�ခြ�မ်းး�စိိတ််ဖြာ�ာခြ�င်းး� အပိုု�င်းး� (၃) [Analysis of Myanmar Military (3)],” The Irrawaddy.