 Establish clear company terms of service which are understandable to local users, setting out what information the company collects and stores and under what legal justification that information can be accessed by the government. Software There are many different kinds of software, but the focus of this chapter is the tools that can aid surveillance; that is, the software that can be added to a telecommunications network in order to increase surveillance capabilities.  Do not sell surveillance software to Myanmar. Surveillance software is not a new issue for Myanmar. As far back as 2000 it was reported that Burmese exiles were being targeted with malware. However, this kind of technology has advanced rapidly in recent years. While the goal of the military government in the 2000’s may have been to stop information exchange or communication by freezing computers or taking websites offline, viruses, malware and spyware contained in infected emails are now capable of doing much more intrusive surveillance. Companies selling surveillance equipment, whether ‘off the shelf’ or bespoke services are under particular scrutiny due to the clear implications for human rights. 401 Sellers of such technologies often justify their use by saying they are intended to support law enforcement or protect the public welfare (e.g. through protecting against terrorist activity), but they often can also be used to facilitate human rights violations by the purchasers. There are currently debates in Europe about tightening export controls to restrict the kinds of surveillance technology that can be exported, particularly to governments with a poor human rights record. 402 Due to the lack of legal framework around surveillance, interception and privacy protections, Myanmar should be a no-go area for companies selling surveillance technology. 403 D. Relevant International Standards on Surveillance and Lawful Interception Relevant International Standards:  International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance (Necessary and Proportionate Principles) 2014 Relevant Guidance:  Universal Implementation Guide for the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance (2015)  Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) Human Rights and Technology Sales: How Corporations Can Avoid Assisting Repressive Regimes (2012). 401 See commentary by the Chair of the OECD Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct, “Responsible Business Conduct in Cyberspace” (30 April 2015). 402 For example, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is working on a data collection program in support of the European Commission’s ongoing impact assessment for the review of the EU dualuse regulation. 403 For more guidance, see Tech UK “Assessing CyberSecurity Export Risks“ (2014). CHAPTER 4.4: SURVEILLANCE – LAWFUL INTERCEPTION & OTHER SURVEILLANCE METHODS 179 4 4.4