distribution or conveyance of incorrect information with dishonesty or participation.” These are vague terms that are not defined in the Law or further regulation and can and have been used by the Government to characterise legitimate expression as “disturbing or threating”, making the expression punishable as a criminal offense. Arts. 66(d) and 68(a). o These are “cognizable offences”, a categorisation that is typically reserved for serious offences such as rape and murder, and that also allow for arrests to be made by a police officer without a warrant issued by a judicial authority (Art 80).  Arbitrary blocking or filtering of content o The Law enables the Ministry, with the approval of the Government, to direct a license holder “to temporarily suspend a telecommunication service, stop or prohibit any type of communication or use telecommunication services and telecommunication equipment in a temporarily restricted manner when the circumstances warrant for the benefit of the people.” (Art. 77). This is a vaguely worded provision that allows blocking or filtering of content that does not include process or substantive safeguards that would limit the Government’s powers to direct a license holder to take these steps.  Arbitrary Disruption or Disconnection of Internet Access o The same provision allows the Government to suspend or take control of telecommunications services, but the situations in which the Government can exercise this power are unclear under the Law (Art. 77). Risks to the Right to Privacy  Government monitoring and surveillance of user activity and content o The Myanmar Government has a long history of close surveillance of its people. The 2013 Telecommunications Law maintains a legal basis for monitoring communications and content. Article 75 allows interception but does not clearly articulate definitions or justifications for interception, beyond a broadly worded reference to “national security” and “rule of law.” Such broadly worded provisions, without further safeguards and more detailed regulations, significantly increase the risk of misuse of intrusive surveillance capabilities. While the clause added that this should be done “without affecting the fundamental rights of the citizens,” this protection is only available to citizens and raises the question of whether that means that the remaining provisions of the Law are not limited by fundamental rights considerations  Government access to user-identifying information and implications o Article 69 requires a court order for the disclosure of information kept in secured or encrypted systems. However, there are still no implementing regulations governing the interception of communications by law enforcement authorities. o The Government has expansive powers to, for example, “examine any necessary person and require to furnish any necessary information, data, papers and documents” and to “enter and inspect” buildings, places and equipment without any further restrictions. (Art. 40(a)) or “intercept” communications when an “emergency situation” arises (Art. 77). These powers do not require a court order nor do they need probable cause. Implementing regulations are therefore necessary to provide clarity on the appropriate restrictions and procedures for the exercise of that power. o Any or all of the provisions above can be used to override anonymity, and may constitute a separate basis for violation of the right to privacy. Implicating Private Sector Companies in Human Rights Violations  There is a clear potential for ICT companies to become involved in Government violations of human rights because licensees are subject to suspension or termination of licenses (Art. 5) for failure to comply with a broad set of conditions (Art. 57). Extraterritorial Application  The Telecommunications Law applies to all Myanmar citizens inside and outside the country. This is an extraordinarily broad scope which permits the surveillance of Myanmar citizens as well as other violations of their privacy anywhere in the world. 4