of calls, intercepting text messages and web traffic emails and the tracking of user locations without the assistance of providers (Potkin, After pressuring telecom firms, Myanmar’s junta bans executives from leaving, 2021). Documentation for post-coup arrest warrants have been said to demonstrate triangulation between social media users that have been critical of the military, and the individual addresses of their internet connections to find their location. This has been attributed to the use of specialized foreign technology (Beech, 2021). “After the coup I feel really insecure especially because of the junta and the technology behind them” (FGD_06) Perceptions of digital repression include an understanding that there is significant technological capacity behind the military and that ‘if they want to, they can get your information no matter what you do’. This has further installed a greater sense of insecurity among netizens which further perpetuates selfcensorship and a culture of silence. For instance, many journalists and human rights defenders are in hiding and are reluctant to operate remotely due to increasing digital insecurity. anymore. They can just arrest us anytime they want, if they don’t like me, they can use whatever law to arrest me.” (FGD_02) Respondents expressed a keen desire for lawful redress, and a preoccupation with what was identified as a lack of legal recourse experienced following the coup. A majority of survey respondents also expressed knowledge of one or more laws concerning their FoE. A perceived indiscriminate targeting of youth for a range of activities can be indicated as a key factor in both heightening the desire for legal recourse and diminishing of faith in the existing laws and their implementation. Participants also shared experiences of the law being used unfavorably against them by other civilians.7 80% of survey participants expressed familiarity with Section 505(a) of the Penal Code, which in effect has been used to criminalize any comments related to the illegitimacy of the coup, or the military government and has been used since the start of the coup to detain and arrest young people. Violation of Section 505(a) is punishable by up to three years in prison (Human Rights Watch, 2021). 4.2.5 Social Media Surveillance 4.2.4 Law(lessness) “Even though FoE was not fully exercised in the past, we could still express our feelings or thoughts. There were some laws like 66D (Telecommunication Law), but compared to now, we could express ourselves and at the same time rely on the law. Right now, that is not the case 24 There are over 29 million active social media users in Myanmar (Datareportal, 2021), a large proportion of whom access the internet through their smartphones and spend most of their time on social media platforms. Facebook data reports that up to 27 million users can be reached through advertising on their platform, and 7 Examples were given of those on the receiving end of social punishment, turning against those behind it and reporting them. recent statistics indicate an increase of activity on platforms such as Twitter and Instagram following the coup. Social media has been and is increasingly being used as a tool for control. The article ‘Pretending to be States: The Use of Facebook by Armed Groups in Myanmar’ by Stein Tønnesson, Min Zaw Oo & Ne Lynn Aung (2021) identified three stages in the use of Facebook by armed groups and the military in Myanmar in recent years:’ The freewheeling phase (2012–2015), when young activists, students, soldiers and guerrilla fighters discovered the new media’s potential for disseminating views and emotions. The manipulative phase (2015–2017), when the Tatmadaw, several armed groups and political activists realized Facebook’s potential and invested in propaganda through official and unofficial accounts, and a more restrictive phase (2017–2021), where Facebook was exposed to criticism and responded by building capacity to remove undesirable content” (Tønnesson, Min Zaw Oo, & Ne Lynn Aung, 2021). Today, soldiers are being tasked with conducting ‘information combat’, using their personal profiles on various platforms including Facebook, Twitter, TikTok, and Telegram to discredit the previous NLD government with claims of election fraud and to denounce anti-coup protestors as traitors (Potkin & Lone, 2021). While research respondents expressed concern over fake news, misinformation and propaganda on Facebook, they also demonstrated a keen eye for identifying fake news and propaganda for what it is and demonstrated a level of control in managing this (reporting it on Facebook). An even bigger cause for concern now is the explicit link between social media activity and the consequences offline, which participants described as arrests, detention, harming their loved ones, torture and death. “When things like that happen, you second guess “should I post this or not?” On Facebook, you’re supposed to have this