independent media. This spike occurred precisely when voters required access to investigative reporting to vet candidates, identify election intimidation, and monitor overt influence campaigns. By engineering this spike, the military undermined the deliberative phase of the election and increased the likelihood of hiding any electoral manipulation. While the previous 79% blocks was already significant, it was not total information control as it still allowed some access. By increasing the independent news vacuum during the elections, the military ensured that its own propaganda, disseminated via State-controlled media, faced less digital competition. By increasing media blocks from 79% to 93% during the elections, the military ensured that the most critical phase of the election occurred in an information desert Following the election, the blocking rate marginally declined from 93% to 85% after the end of January 2026. This drop suggests that once the military’s electoral objectives were secured, the high levels of campaign-period interference were no longer deemed as necessary. This fluctuation confirms that network interference is a dynamic tool of political control, calibrated to the military’s calendar. Precision blocks against critical media The blocks have not been applied uniformly since the coup, but focused against the most credible threats to the military’s narrative. Media known for uncovering military atrocities and corruption faced the most severe website blockades. Before the election, the media outlets Myanmar Now, Mizzima, and The Irrawaddy faced the highest blocking rates of 85%, 84%, and 75% respectively. During the election countdown, these rates escalated to 98%, 92%, and 98%, rendering their websites virtually invisible to the domestic public without adequate circumvention tools. Local, small and medium-sized media outlets have been similarly targeted since the coup, particularly those reporting from conflict zones where the military was conducting systematic human rights abuses. Myitkyina News Journal, covering Kachin State and the military’s attacks on the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), faced blocking rates of 76%. Narinjara News, reporting in Rakhine State on fighting between the military and the Arakan Army (AA) faced 73% blocks. Karen Information Centre, covering military attacks on the Karen National Union (KNU) in Karen State faced 69% blocking. Page 8 of 17

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