Chicago Journal of International Law III). Given this Comment’s examination of whether social media companies risk international criminal liability when they grant inciters a platform, it is imperative to explore whether a corporation may be held responsible for international crimes and the implications of this inquiry on criminal liability. Although scholars continue to debate the normative question of whether ICL should extend to corporations, ICL does not generally allow for their prosecution as collective entities.143 The Rome Statute states that “[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.”144 The use of “natural persons” was no accident. The drafters of the Rome Statute disagreed about whether criminal liability ought to be extended to “legal persons,” knowing it would include corporations under its jurisdiction, but ultimately decided against this language.145 While corporations as collectives cannot be subjected to ICC prosecution, their individual employees can, even when engaging in business activity. According to Cassel, there is a long history of corporate executives being held criminally responsible under ICL.146 ICL has been applied in instances where a company’s employee committed a crime him or herself, as well as instances where that employee aided and abetted in the commission of a crime. Wolfgang Kaleck and Miriam Saage-Maaß endorse this view, writing that “[c]ase law shows that individuals within a corporation . . . can be held criminally liable for the commission” of an international crime “occurring in the process of ‘doing business.’”147 Such precedent dates back to the Nuremberg trials, which demonstrate that corporate executives are not immune from criminal prosecution. For example, in the principal Nuremberg case, “German industrialist Gustav Krupp was originally indicted along with top Nazi government, party and military 143 144 145 146 147 See Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 955, 955 (2008) (“Corporations are not presently subject to criminal liability under international law.”). Some argue that ICL does currently permit corporate liability. See, for example, Caroline Kaeb, The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability Under International Criminal Law, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 351, 355 (2016) (“The legal debate needs to move beyond the mere question of whether corporate liability exists under international law to the more granular question of what standards should be established for such liability and how to implement them effectively.”). These arguments fall outside the scope of this Comment, which anchors its ICL analysis in the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute explicitly restricts liability to natural persons. Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 25(1). See Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 2031 (2001) (“The disagreement among states about corporate criminal liability was apparent at the 1998 Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court.”). Cassel, supra note 116, at 306. Wolfgang Kaleck & Miriam Saage-Maaß, Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations Amounting to International Crimes, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 699, 700 (2008). 104 Vol. 21 No. 1