How Social Media Companies Could Be Complicit in
Incitement to Genocide
Neema Hakim
Abstract
This Comment examines whether social media companies risk international criminal
liability when they provide a platform for direct and public incitement to commit genocide. To
answer this question, this Comment makes three findings of law. First, pursuant to the Rome
Statute, the Genocide Convention, and caselaw from the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, incitement to genocide is a
crime, not a mode of liability. Second, the mens rea for complicity, according to the Rome Statute,
is knowledge, if the crime in question is coordinated by a group (for example, a social media
campaign to incite genocide). Third, while corporations generally cannot be subjected to
international criminal liability as distinct entities, individuals conducting business on behalf of a
corporation are susceptible to liability. This Comment applies the foregoing legal principles to
employees at social media companies at various levels of the corporate hierarchy, at times through
the example of Facebook in Myanmar. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that individual
employees at social media companies may be complicit in incitement to genocide where certain legal
requirements are satisfied. This conclusion compels a broader discussion about reforming
international criminal law to stem the global propagation of disinformation, where such
propagation constitutes incitement to genocide.
J.D. Candidate, 2021, The University of Chicago Law School. The author wishes to thank his
partner Barbara Silva for her endless love, faith, and support. The author also wishes to thank the
entire Chicago Journal of International Law editorial staff for their extensive review, his editor Christine
Liu for her guidance, and Professor Adam Chilton for his advisement.
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