democracy. We must fight for it. They promised democratization in 1990 and we are still waiting.29 In line with Voltmer’s theories (Table 1), interviewees who had lived in exile were more likely to favor unrestrained struggle against the government than those who had remained in Myanmar. By dividing her theories into three distinct models, however, Voltmer fails to capture the significance of disagreements among journalists over accommodation with the existing regime. Such divisions have allowed authoritarian governments in other places to divide and rule the media (Burrett, 2011). To build mutual trust, in December 2014, members of the IPC attended the first joint workshop between the military and media to exchange ideas about building an information system that works better for both parties (Zaw, 2014). The IPC explained to General Min Aung Hlaing, the then commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces who attended the meeting, that media reporting is often inadvertently biased against the regime due to a lack of freedom of information. Representatives of the military and their civilian colleagues in government were reluctant to talk to journalists. When reporters could not get a quote from official sources, stories often seemed one-sided.30 The IPC advised the military to provide more points of contact for journalists in order to improve the public image of the armed forces. Authoritarian authorities’ inability to adapt to the demands of the liberalizing media is another factor not included in Voltmer’s models. Journalists interviewed for this study were not only critical of government secrecy, but also of suspicion of the media among Myanmar’s opposition parties, especially the NLD. Following the end of pre-publication censorship, photos of Aung San Suu Kyi appeared on newspaper front pages almost daily—something previously unthinkable when her name could not even be mentioned in the press. But most journalists interviewed for this study complained that getting ‘the Lady’ and her party to comment on the news could be difficult. After decades of government harassment and attempts at infiltration by state agents, the NLD leadership was wary of strangers: It takes a long time to win the trust of NLD press officers. Even today, government informers try to get inside the party. It is not surprising that they are paranoid, but it makes it hard to get access [to the party]. Only trusted journalists are invited to interview the Lady.31 The NLD’s reluctance to talk to journalists outside their select circle inhibited reporting on the party’s policies 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 and activities in the run up to the 2015 elections. Journalists who criticize the NLD, even with the aim of helping the party improve its operations, found themselves ostracized. The following quotation is typical of the sentiments expressed by many interviewees: If I criticize the NLD I will be the common enemy of everyone. Sometimes I am more afraid of the NLD than of the military. If I attack the president and the military, my colleagues and readers will approve. They hate the military and are ready to believe the worst of them. But if I criticize the NLD, the party and its supporters will punish me.32 Many interviewees also cited over-centralization and a dearth of professional staff as factors hampering the NLD’s media operation: Inside the NLD, the Lady decides everything. Icons do not necessarily make good managers. NLD press conferences are often very chaotic and unprofessional. They don’t know how to use the media to their best advantage….A lot of journalists want to help the NLD, but they don’t invite us to press conferences.33 Several others accuse the NLD of deliberate obfuscation motivated by political expediency: The Lady is sometimes slow to comment on events because she doesn’t want to lose support, for example, over religious conflicts. The NLD focus too much on political issues, like changing the constitution [to allow Aung San Suu Kyi to be president] rather than on the concerns of ordinary people.34 Some journalists also felt the NLD did not do enough to oppose flawed new legislation giving the military-backed government continued oversight of the media: We received very little support from opposition parties in parliament in our struggle with the government over the Media Bill. The Lady’s attention was on other matters and NLD MPs take their lead from her.35 Strong political support for the NLD among the independent media was not always reciprocated. As elections approached, the military-back government was bent on retaining the legal means to restrain media freedom. Without support from the NLD in parliament, journalist groups possessed few mechanisms through which to oppose legislation aimed at maintaining state influence over the media. Opposition parties’ unwillingness Author’s interview with Democratic Voice of Burma presenter, December 2014. Author’s interview with IPC member, December 2014. Author’s interview with a Yangon-based international media agency correspondent, December 2013. Author’s interview with Yangon-based print media journalist, July 2015. Author’s interview with Yangon-based media trainer and journalist, December 2014. Author’s interview with The Chronicle editor, December 2014. Author’s interview with IPC member, December 2014. 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