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11 subsequently found cracks in central pillars beneath a concrete roof covering an area of about 40 by 40 feet and estimated that the added structure weighed at least 10 to 15 tonnes, with greater danger when wet. He recommended replacing the heavy structure with lighter roofing. The trustee explained that the building had deteriorated with age and required urgent repairs to address safety concerns. However, he feared that submitting a formal application for permission to carry out the work could create further disputes over ownership of the building and the surrounding land. As obtaining permission was difficult, the community therefore arranged the necessary repairs and maintenance locally. Community members watched for police and municipal officials, and workers temporarily stopped whenever a warning whistle signalled that officials were approaching.22 The community completed the work in about a week. The main prayer hall remained standing during the March 2025 earthquake. The trustee believed that removing the heavy roof had helped prevent a collapse and said about 150 people would have been inside had the building fallen. BHRN could not independently verify that causal link. Personal Connections and Payments Personal connections could determine whether a mosque obtained construction or repair approval. One trustee who secured formal construction permission described applications moving through ward, township, district, and regional offices, but said relationships with officials were central to getting approval. He said the person leading an application needed to be respected and influential at ward level and that mosques without such connections faced ‘considerable difficulties.’ He also described disputes in which officials objected to changes in the height of a rebuilt mosque and to newly installed tiles, and said a separate two-storey school building was ordered demolished to its foundations after a complaint. 23 BHRN also documented payments linked to mosque construction and repair. A witness at a village mosque in Sintgaing Township said officials repeatedly requested money while repairs were underway, payments connected to repair or construction processes.24 A Mandalay trustee interviewed in September 2026 alleged that payments were required at ward, township, and regional levels. “It is all under the table. You have to pay at the ward, township, and regional levels.... If you do not pay, you cannot get it.” He said mosque trustees arranged the payments personally rather than through mosque organisations.25 BHRN could not determine in every case whether the payments described by other witnesses were official fees, unofficial payments, or a combination of both. Land and Documentation Barriers Land status and documentation requirements created another barrier to mosque repair. A lawyer interviewed by BHRN said some longstanding mosque properties in Mandalay lack formal proof of 22 BHRN Interview 13, Myanmar, 19 June 2025. 23 BHRN Interview 14, Myanmar, 19 June 2025. 24 BHRN Interview 6, Myanmar, 13 April 2025. BHRN Interview 7, Myanmar, 13 April 2025. BHRN Interview 8, Myanmar, 13 April 2025. 25 BHRN Interview 17, Myanmar, 13 September 2026.

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Blocked From Rebuilding: Myanmar Junta Restrictions on Mosque Repair and Reconstruction

Report

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Language

English

Topic

Earthquake
Military Coup
Rohingya Crisis

Author(s)

Burma Human Rights Network

Date Published: Oct 7, 2026

Abstract: On March 28, 2025, a magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck central Myanmar as Muslims gathered for Friday prayers, killing large numbers of worshippers and damaging or destroying mosques. BHRN documented at least 180 earthquake-affected mosques and other Islamic religious buildings in 29 townships across Mandalay Region, Sagaing Region, Naypyidaw Union Territory, Bago Region, and southern Shan State, and at least 670 deaths among Muslims when mosques and other Islamic religious buildings collapsed. This report documents how decades of restrictions on mosque construction, repair, and renovation prevented or deterred some Muslim communities from addressing known structural risks before the disaster and continued to obstruct demolition, repair, and reconstruction afterward. Before the earthquake, Muslim communities faced years-long delays and unclear approval procedures for major repairs and structural work. Some communities repeatedly sought permission without receiving a formal permit. At one Mandalay mosque, an engineer identified cracks in supporting pillars beneath an excessively heavy roof, but the trustee feared that a formal application would create further problems over the mosque’s land and ownership. The community carried out the urgent work discreetly while watching for police and municipal officials. Other interviewees described leaking roofs, weakened pillars, deteriorating brickwork, and other repairs that could not be completed through a clear and predictable process. After the earthquake, the Myanmar military junta continued to restrict the demolition, repair, and reconstruction of damaged mosques. BHRN documented communities waiting for permission to demolish unsafe structures, clear damaged sites, repair buildings, or rebuild destroyed mosques. In Bone Oh Village, none of the damaged mosques had received demolition permission three months after the earthquake. By September 2026, some applications had advanced, but many remained unresolved. One Mandalay trustee said that more than 70 mosques had submitted applications, while only four had received repair permission and Panthay Mosque was the only mosque he knew to have received permission to rebuild from scratch. In Bago Region, a mosque received a demolition order two months after the earthquake but later obtained a construction permit. Some communities were still using temporary prayer spaces more than a year after the earthquake. BHRN found no clear, uniform legal framework governing mosque repair and reconstruction. Instead, communities described a system shaped by differing local requirements, official discretion, and informal practices. Lawyers, mosque trustees, and construction professionals said applications could pass through religious-affairs offices, municipal departments, land offices, the General Administration Department, and other junta-controlled offices, with requirements varying by location. One trustee who obtained approval said personal relationships and local influence were important and that mosques without such connections faced considerable difficulties. BHRN also documented allegations of payments connected to mosque repair and construction, although the available evidence did not establish whether every payment was an official fee or an unofficial payment. Land and documentation requirements created further barriers. Some longstanding mosque compounds lack the ownership or land-registration documents demanded during permit processes because they pre-date current registration systems. BHRN found that recognised religious-land status did not guarantee reconstruction permission, while communities without that status could be required to obtain land documents before a building application would be considered. The requirements varied between locations, leaving Muslim communities without a consistent route to repair or rebuild their places of worship. The restrictions documented in this report interfere with the right to freedom of religion or belief, including the ability of Muslim communities to establish, maintain, and use places of worship. Restrictions imposed because a site is Muslim, or applied more restrictively to Muslim places of worship than to comparable religious sites without objective and reasonable justification, constitute religious discrimination. The earthquake triggered the collapses, but BHRN documented how discriminatory restrictions prevented or deterred some Muslim communities from addressing known structural risks before the disaster and delayed work needed to make damaged sites safe afterward. Governments, ASEAN, the European Union, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, donors, and United Nations agencies should support affected Muslim communities through independent and locally led channels, strengthen targeted measures against those responsible for serious human rights violations, and support international and domestic accountability efforts. Assistance should not strengthen junta-controlled institutions or force affected communities to rely on discriminatory administrative systems where alternative channels are available.

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Blocked From Rebuilding: Myanmar Junta Restrictions on Mosque Repair and Reconstruction

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