8/22/22, 10:18 PM Myanmar: Freedom on the Net 2019 Country Report | Freedom House Self-censorship is particularly common in discussing or reporting on the Rohingya. 93 For example, some journalists and media outlets have opted to use terms such as “Muslims” in order to lessen potential backlash online or, if the outlet is progovernment, the discriminatory term “Bengalis” is sometimes used, in an attempt to link the Rohingya to Bangladesh. 94 Pro-Rohingya activists have largely relied on social media and the international media to distribute information about violence and discrimination in Rakhine State, partly because few domestic media outlets are willing to take the security and financial risks of violence and boycotts associated with reporting on the crisis. 95 Despite their later pardon, the conviction of two Reuters journalists, Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, on politically motivated charges is a threat to other journalists and human rights defenders working on related issues (see C3), and has contributed to self-censorship. The fact that they work for Reuters, one of the world’s largest media companies, has underlined the seriousness of the threat. Self-censorship on gender issues is also widespread online among journalists and human rights defenders. 96 Women discussing sex and women’s bodies online are often abused and harassed. 97 For example, while the global #MeToo campaign gained initial traction in Myanmar, some activists claim that survivors of sexual violence now often self-censor, having seen the intimidation faced by other women who have spoken out. 98 B5 0-4 pts Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 1/4 The government and the military continue to dominate public discourse. Despite years of affirming their desire for media freedom, once in power, the ruling NLD resolved to retain state-run media 99 in order to control publicly available information. 100 As a result, the government and the military still control the entire broadcasting sector and a significant portion of print media, including those outlets’ online publications, either directly through the Ministry of Information or via joint ventures with private companies. 101 Hopes that the NLD would increase the editorial independence of state-controlled media and joint-venture media outlets have evaporated. 102 The government and military have sought to control information domestically. Manipulated progovernment content has become pervasive online, particularly on Facebook. 103 The military published inflammatory content regularly on Facebook before being banned by the platform in 2018 (see B2). 104 According to multiple sources, nearly 700 military officials were involved in a systematic campaign of misinformation for five years, creating and managing fake Facebook accounts and pages, which were then used to share false, misleading, and inciting content. Organized troll accounts allegedly helped spread the content to reach more users. 105 The government continues to post on the Facebook pages of the Ministry of Information, 106 the State Counsellor Office, 107 and the Information Committee. 108 The latter was established to provide the public with “unbiased” information to combat “fake” reports from international media on the Rohingya and the conflict. It was originally called the “State Counsellor’s Information Committee,” before being renamed, reportedly either to demonstrate that the government is not dominated by Aung San Suu Kyi, 109 or to distance her from some of the page’s more infamous pronouncements. 110 https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2019 9/20