Digital struggle and resistance in the Myanmar revolution 10/31/24, 11:36 AM activists and journalists as early as 2018. The panellists emphasised the need for international stakeholder involvement to mitigate surveillance by such authoritarian regimes. After the coup, internet blackouts and selective shutdowns became more frequent, with access restricted through a whitelist system, where VPNs became a tool of necessity for the people. Social media weaponisation, particularly on platforms such as TikTok and Telegram, has intensified, with military propaganda, targeted harassment and doxxing becoming widespread. Major telecom companies have exited the country, and the military has ordered surveillance equipment to be installed in the telecom infrastructure. The government amended laws, such as the Electronic Transactions Law and the law protecting citizens’ privacy and security, to allow arbitrary search of users’ devices without court warrants. Additionally, it inserted interception powers into the existing counterterrorism law. In an urgent move, a new draft of cyber security law was introduced, which includes provisions to criminalise the use of VPNs. Mandatory SIM registration is being hastily enforced and electronic identity database systems are being introduced, which require citizens to switch to smart IDs in areas under military control as part of pilot programmes. There are also threats from spyware and malware, such as Mustang Panda, targeting civil society organisations and the National Unity Government (NUG), the country’s government in exile. The most recent threat, apart from banning VPNs, is deploying the latest surveillance technologies, such as firewalls and network behavioural profiling. The panellists concluded by referencing Steven Feldstein’s book “The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance” (2021), noting that the Myanmar military employs a comprehensive array of digital repression techniques, including internet shutdowns, censorship, targeted persecution of online users, spread of manipulated information and disinformation, and extensive surveillance. Internet inaccessibility and alternative communication Another MIP representative at the meeting discussed alternative communication methods in response to internet inaccessibility. Internet https://www.apc.org/node/40396 Page 5 of 10