6.2.1 VIRALITY 41 6.2.2 NEWS FEED & RANKING 43 6.2.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USER BEHAVIOUR AND ACTIONS 43 6.2.4 GROUPS 44 6.3 HOW META’S ALGORITHMS FUELED ANTI-ROHINGYA VIOLENCE IN MYANMAR 6.3.1 RECOMMENDATIONS & NEWS FEED 6.4 PERILOUS TRANSACTIONS: FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, ADVERTISING, AND ANTIROHINGYA HATE 45 46 48 6.4.1 INSTANT ARTICLES 48 6.4.2 PAID ADVERTISING 49 7. A DISASTER FOREWARNED: META’S “WILFUL BLINDNESS” IN MYANMAR 50 7.1 WARNINGS RECEIVED BY META THAT IT RISKED CONTRIBUTING TO MASS VIOLENCE IN MYANMAR 51 7.1.1 TIMELINE OF INTERVENTIONS 51 7.2 META’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE RISKS INHERENT IN ITS ALGORITHMS 54 7.3 ‘MOVING FAST AND BREAKING THINGS’: HOW META’S COMPANY CULTURE EXACERBATED HUMAN RIGHTS RISKS 55 8. META’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS HARMS SUFFERED BY THE ROHINGYA 58 8.1 META’S ROLE IN HUMAN RIGHTS HARMS 59 8.2 META’S DUE DILIGENCE FAILURES IN MYANMAR 60 8.2.1 META’S KNOWLEDGE OF RISK OF ALGORITHMIC HARM 60 8.2.2 META’S KNOWLEDGE OF MYANMAR-SPECIFIC RISKS 60 8.3 META’S FAILURE TO EFFECTIVELY MITIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS RISKS 61 8.3.1 AN “INESCAPABLE” CONCLUSION: META SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTED TO HUMAN RIGHTS HARMS SUFFERED BY THE ROHINGYA 62 9. META AND THE RIGHT TO REMEDY FOR THE ROHINGYA 64 9.1 IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: ROHINGYA COMMUNITIES DEMAND AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY64 9.2 META’S REFUSAL TO REMEDIATE THE ROHINGYA 66 9.3 REMEDY FOR THE ROHINGYA: ADEQUATE COMPENSATION AND SYSTEMIC CHANGE 67 10. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 70 CONCLUSION 70 RECOMMENDATIONS 71 THE SOCIAL ATROCITY META AND THE RIGHT TO REMEDY FOR THE ROHINGYA Amnesty International 4