Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) Crime as Cognitive Constraint and punish, while individuals are to be prosecuted. 136 In particular, state parties to the treaty have the duty to enact necessary legislation that would “give effect” to the provisions of the treaty and to “provide effective penalties” for any of the punishable acts enumerated.137 National laws criminalizing incitement to genocide are consistent with Article 20 of the ICCPR on allowable limitations on the right to freedom of expression. 138 Penalizing incitement to genocide is an allowable limitation as long as it meets Article 19(3) requirements of being validly enacted, necessary to protect a legitimate aim, and the limitation proportionate to achieve that aim. 139 2. Individual (criminal) responsibility Just as the Genocide Convention imposes a legal obligation on states, it provides under Article IV that natural persons committing any of the acts under Article III shall be punished, “whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.” 140 Such persons must be tried “by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.”141 Under the treaty, the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide has two distinct elements. First, language must be “direct.” 142 In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the Trial Chamber held that the speech must assume “a direct form and specifically provoke another to engage in a criminal act, and that more than mere vague or indirect suggestion goes to constitute direct incitement.” 143 This contemplated literal and figurative speech. For instance, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, and Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka all revolved around how the “work” metaphor was deployed in various statements. 144 136. Philippa Webb, Binocular Vision: State Responsibility and Individual Criminal Responsibility for Genocide, in THE DIVERSIFICATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 148 (Van den Herik & Stahn eds., 2012) (discussing international law’s two regimes of responsibility for genocide). 137. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. V. 138. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 121, art. 20. 139. Id. art. 19(3). 140. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. IV. 141. Id. art. VI. 142. Id. art. III(c). 143. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 557 (Sept. 2, 1998). 144. Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 44(iv) (June 1, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgement and 167