2018, before the second round of elections, new hoaxes circulated online. One hoax portrayed former adult actress Mia Khalifa as Gustavo Petro’s illegitimate daughter, supposedly voting against her father. Another featured Petro sharing a hoax which portrayed another adult actor as the apparent winner of a quantum physics prize. While it is unclear if either hoax had political intentions, they obtained thousands of shares and followers—the Khalifa post registered 23,000 shares (Penarredonda, 2018). The spread of misinformation remains very high. One trending disinformation strategy in Latin American countries is to cast doubt on the integrity of the electoral process. These conspiracy theories were repeated in Brazil, Mexico, and in Colombia, but in no case has there been any evidence of large-scale ballot tampering. Though fake accounts imitating politicians and celebrities have been identified, it seems that the bulk of disinformation in Colombia has been disseminated organically (Argüello, s. f.). Many politicians have engaged with fake content and even shared websites that spread blatantly false and polarizing information, such as voces.com.co and oiganoticias.com. As a result, there have been increasing efforts to introduce fact-checking and verification techniques. These have ranged from mainstream media alliances, such as Semana and El Tiempo, to specific sections in media outlets like Colombia Check, La Silla Vacía and El Poder de Elegir, some of which, for instance, focused on WhatsApp chains (Penarredonda, 2018). The volume of disinformation was far beyond what those bodies could handle and they were often flooded with requests from users. On the other hand, amplification techniques of pro-government content have been detected in Twitter during 2019. As the Digital Forensic Research Lab (2019a) concluded, in three Twitter campaigns that took place between May and July that year, automated accounts were used to amplify content, although they were not of fundamental importance to the campaign. Disinformation campaigns were also observed during the protests triggered by the national strike of 21 November 2019. On the one hand, xenophobic messages were spread across social media and WhatsApp, targeting Venezuelans who were accused taking advantage of the turmoil to loot, encouraging panic among the population (Digital Forensic Research Lab, 2019b). At the same time, the president Iván Duque was subject of a trolling campaign exposing details about his private life. Research by Diretoria de Analisis de Politicas Públicas of Fundação Getulio Vargas and Linterna Verde has shown that the incident revealed the use of anti-government cyborg accounts (Cortés, 2019). Table 2: Observed Strategies, Tools and Techniques of Social Media Manipulation in Colombia Account Types Messaging and Valence Content and Platforms Communication Strategies Human, Bots, Real Pro-government, pro-party Disinformation, WhatsApp, Twitter, and fake accounts messages, Driving Amplification strategies, Facebook, division/polarization, Trolling Data-driven strategies, YouTube and suppressing speech, Trolls Attacks on opposition Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. 82