outlets received government funds for paid advertising in English on Twitter and Facebook. The goal of these advertisement was to convey the Chinese position on trade and economics to the American people. As such, outlets like China Daily, CGTN, and Global Times (owned by the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party) began promoting info-graphs and videos justifying China’s position and its willingness to make a deal with Trump (DFRLab, 2019). The success of these campaigns cannot be measured, however, opinion polls in Ukraine and Slovakia have shown that China is perceived as more helpful during the current pandemic than the EU. Moreover, a poll in Italy has shown that Italians consider China a better international partner than the United States (European External Action Service, 2020). Table 2: Observed Strategies, Tools and Techniques of Social Media Manipulation in China Account Types Messaging and Valence Content and Platforms Communication Strategies Automated, Fake Global influence Hashtag manipulation, Twitter, Facebook, Human Enhancing China’s image Creation of fake infoWeChat, Weibo globally during Covid-19 graphs and videos, Messages attempting to Amplifying content discredit the legitimacy of through the use of bots, protesters in Hong Kong, Spreading fake news Pro Chinese government regarding Covid-19, Hong messages, pro-China Kong Protesters, and content in regards to Taiwanese politicians handling of COVID -19 Doxxing 50 cent army promotes Political ads abroad mostly positive and distracting messages. Attacking dissidents in Hong Kong Interference in Taiwan elections Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. Organizational Capacity and Resources The scope of government-led activity in the Hong Kong protests is hard to assess, however, data collected from accounts that were deleted by platforms may be revealing. Research found that in at least one large coordinated network, there were over nine hundred “core” accounts, originating from mainland China, that shared content attempting to undermine the Hong Kong protesters’ legitimacy. These accounts were significantly amplified by some two hundred thousand automated accounts, engaging with the messages being disseminated (PA Media, 2019). The amount spent by the government on partnerships with private contracting companies and individuals is unclear, though fragments of evidence have recently surfaced. For example, the contract between state-owned China News Service and private contracting company OneSight, 75