A key foreign player in the Belarusian disinformation market is Russia. Belarus might be one of the most vulnerable countries to the influence of the Russian state propaganda. More than 40% of the population considered the Russian state-controlled television channels their main sources of information (Laputska & Papko, 2017). Two-thirds of all the content that is being broadcasted in Belarus originates from Russia (Laputska & Papko, 2017). Chulitskaya (2020) identified 64 actors—mostly junk news websites—that disseminated pro-Russian narratives online. These actors operated 149 social media groups, pages, profiles, and websites. A Warsaw-Based research center EAST identified at least 40 news outlets that are based in Belarus and focus on local agenda but are openly or covertly supported by Russia. Outlets such as vitbich.org, sozh.info and grodnodaily.net have a probable link to Russia through its embassy and other connections (Yeliseyeu, 2019). Sputnik Belarus, a branch of a vast news network Sputnik that is controlled by the Russian government, is one of the most visited online news sources that focus on Belarus (Yeliseyeu, 2020). The key narrative that Sputnik Belarus broadcasted in 2019 included “Belarusians as part of the Russian nation,” “the west aggressiveness towards Belarus” and “neighbouring countries that joined the EU are degrading” (Yeliseyeu, 2020). The Russian news aggregators Yandex and Mail.ru also play a significant agenda-setting role for more than 30% of Belarusian internet users (SimilarWeb Website Ranking, 2020). However, the level of activity of Russian disinformation in Belarus is cyclical and depends on the relationship between Moscow and Minsk. Over recent years, Russian propaganda expanded significantly during periods of political discord between the two governments. During these periods, Russian-controlled websites and Telegram accounts carried out vitriolic campaigns against both state and non-state actors in Belarus (Freedom House, 2019). Following the post-election protests in August 2020, the Belarus government invited a team of technicians, journalists and leaders from RT, a Russian television channel that was frequently found to spread misinformation, to substitute for local state television workers who resigned in protest (Cornaz, 2020). Response To respond to the growing amount of disinformation online, non-state actors have attempted to build fact-checking infrastructure, increase the reach of verified information and debunk junk news. Government actors are mostly concerned with information that originates in Russia. Recently, the Belarusian state has been increasingly conscious of the threat posed by information interference from Russia in domestic political debates. A crucial mechanism used by the Belarusian government to respond to this foreign state-backed misinformation is its own media network. The narrative of Russian state attempts to influence the situation in Belarus is dominant in Belarusian state media (Bykovskyy, 2020). To this end, the government has adopted a new Information Security Concept in March 2019 that is based around the goals of “information sovereignty.” The Concept prioritizes state control of the information space. The most recent Freedom House (2019) report suggests that “the concept likely entails a greater response to Russia’s increasingly aggressive disinformation and propaganda targeting the Lukashenka administration”. As one expert put it, the concept “is aimed at ensuring the information security of the authorities” not the people” (Belarus Security Blog, 2019). References Baltic Internet Policy Initiative. (2020, June 23). Distribution of fake information about the link between COVID-19 and 5G in Belarus, May-June 2020 [Rasprostraneniye feykovoy 45