BELARUS By Aliaksandr Herasimenka Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford Introduction Belarus is one of the most stable authoritarian regimes with an extremely restricted media system. The regime emerged around 1995-96 and since then, it has operated an increasingly controlled network of legacy media that manipulate public opinion. This network relies on underlying tactics of disinformation rooted in old-school media manipulation used during the Soviet times, aimed at defaming political opponents of the regime and spreading misinformation (Disinformation Resilience in Central and Eastern Europe, 2018). National television remains a state monopoly, state institutions own major newspapers and the state regulates FM waves. The government uses these state-controlled media, along with selective financial support for content producers, restrictive laws and intimidation of users, to introduce manipulation into the online landscape (Freedom House, 2019). However, the online landscape remains mostly free from government control and manipulation. There are several reasons for this. First, Belarus’ government largely does not censor online content. Second, media that are independent from the state dominate online space when it comes to news originating from Belarus. However, as more people have started using social media actively and the scale of anti-government protest mobilization has grown recently, the regime has begun to invest more resources into social media manipulation. In this context, it makes sense to distinguish between media controlled by the state (“state-controlled”) and “independent media” outlets. Russia is a major player in the Belarusian media market. Russian propagandists enjoy considerable influence on the Belarusian population, making Belarus very susceptible to Kremlin-backed propaganda (Freedom House, 2019). An Overview of Cyber Troop Activity in Belarus Organizational Form There are four types of major actors that are involved in social media manipulation in Belarus. They are the state, the media, private individuals, and pro-Russian groups. First, the government seemed to be a key source of domestic online misinformation and disinformation in Belarus in recent years. It uses state news outlets, troll armies and the police to spread misinformation online. The Belarusian government controls more than six hundred news outlets (Freedom House, 2019). Examples of such outlets are the newspaper SB: Belarus Today that is owned by the administration of Alyaksandr Lukashenka, president since 1994, as well as three key state-owned television companies Belarus 1, ONT and CTV. Second, many misinformation narratives and disinformation stories originate from state-controlled media. In 2020, “every state outlet showed evidence of propaganda and manipulation,” an independent media monitoring report suggests (Bykovskyy, 2020). Third, several troll groups that are linked to the state operate in Belarus. The media link a key troll farm to a pro-state youth union known as the Belarusian Republican Youth Union (BRSM). The farm was set up by the union in 2011 following a series of Arab Spring-inspired protests. The union created it to oppose “dirt and lies” on social media (Herasimenka, 2013). The idea and aims are reminiscent of the 50-cent Army of human propagandists set up by the Chinese government. Within a year of the BRSM announcement, job adverts appeared that promised $10 per text that should be shared on “pro-opposition forums” (Viasna Human Rights Center, 42