2016a). As was illustrated in the Egyptian migrant worker case, these hashtags may increase the spread of messages designed to “incite sedition” between Kuwait and Egypt (Sabr, 2020). Inauthentic social media accounts are used to “settle personal and political scores”, even using blackmail against influential officials and ministers (Al Jazeera, 2019). News-focussed Facebook pages are also used to spread misinformation. One such post incorrectly reported the death of the emir (Facebook, 2017). The increasing use of bot accounts to spread politically-charged misinformation has created a large market for these bot accounts within Kuwait (Al-Qabas, 2016b). Tareq al-Mulla, professor of information technology at Kuwait University, is quoted stating that within Kuwait there is a large market for accounts with large followings on Twitter, YouTube, SoundCloud and even accounts with large numbers of professional connections on LinkedIn (Al-Qabas, 2016b). Table 2: Observed Strategies, Tools and Techniques of Social Media Manipulation in Kuwait Account Types Messaging and Valence Content and Platforms Communication Strategies Inauthentic Inauthentic amplification, Disinformation, Facebook, Twitter, human accounts attacking opposition amplification YouTube, and bot accounts SoundCloud, LinkedIn Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. Organizational Capacity and Resources While there is no public data on the numbers of people or accounts used by Kuwaiti politicians and government to operate computational propaganda campaigns, as was noted previously, political actors often employ media teams which operate over 250 accounts (Al-Qabas, 2019b). Furthermore, the department of cyber-crime in Kuwait reported in January 2019 that it had shut down hundreds of bot accounts, mostly on Twitter (Al-Qabas, 2019a). The department also recorded a further 2,000 cases of online libel, slander, blackmail and impersonation between January and October 2018 (Al-Qabas, 2019a). Table 3: Cyber Troop Capacity in Kuwait Team Size Resources Spent Activity Levels (USD) Up to 250 Temporary issueaccounts per based politician Coordination No evidence Capacity Measure Medium References Al Arabiya. (2020, March 26). Kuwait investigates influencer over promoting 'Covid-19 test’. Al Arabiya. https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c201khdy Al Jazeera. (2019, November 14). ‫ ثروات وتصفیة حسابات‬..‫مواقع التواصل االجتماعي في الكویت‬. Al Jazeera. Al-Qabas. (2016a, March 27). ‫ سوق رائجة‬..‫الحسابات الوهمیة على مواقع التواصل‬. Al-Qabas. https://alqabas.com/article/8145 233