As previously outlined, the primary computational propaganda tool in Iraq is Facebook. The pages generated on Facebook by professional bloggers and political actors gather followers rapidly after their creation, party through the use of paid social media advertisements, and party through the publication of innocuous content such as comic strips to attract users. Some pages also post fabricated documents to attract audiences, this could include documents reporting financial corruption that have not previously been published by mainstream media. Other pages digitally edit official documents to give their platforms false credibility ( 2019 ,‫)خلود العامري‬. Some pages publish specific content to attract audiences, such as hate speech, abuse against specific politicians and calls for violence against political actors. These calls for violence are most frequently targeted toward female political candidates running in Iraqi parliamentary elections (Niqash, 2018a). A report into these campaigns found that they were systematic, and targeted toward the 2,000 female political candidates (Al-Ittihad, 2018). A report found that defamation attempts against female candidates can include the publication of sexual videos, allegedly involving these candidates. The report could not verify the clips, but quoted a female candidate stating that “some parties try to defame her to make sure she cannot win the elections” (Al-Quds al-Arabi, 2018a). Groups with their own cyber troop capacities, such as Hezbollah, employ a team to run the Facebook pages. Team members are given a mobile phone, an iPad and a Visa card to pay for post boosts to attract audiences (Crisp & al-Salhy, 2020). These teams are provided with training to avoid censorship (Crisp & al-Salhy, 2020). Hezbollah focusses on posting disinformation that undermines the reputation of political rivals. While Facebook is the main platform used by cyber troops in Iraq, some pages also have documented links to other sites, such as Twitter and YouTube (2,21). Video footage of politicians statements is often edited to focus on the most sensationalist quotes, then published on these YouTube channels (2,21). An IMH report noted that the group Fursan al-Karahiyah (Knights of Hate) often engaged in such multi-platform posting (Iraqi Media House, n.d.). Table 2: Observed Strategies, Tools and Techniques of Social Media Manipulation in Iraq Account Types Messaging and Valence Content and Platforms Communication Strategies Distraction, attacking opposition, generating support Disinformation, amplifying Facebook, content YouTube, Twitter Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. Organizational Capacity and Resources In May 2020, Facebook removed a total of 324 pages, 71 accounts, 5 groups and 31 Instagram accounts identified as Iraqi cyber troops (Crisp & al-Salhy, 2020). Facebook noted that the accounts were followed by 4.4 million accounts. These Facebook pages have been very successful in engaging audiences. One of the most active pages is called “Haramiyah” (Thieves), and is followed by around 573,000 accounts ( 2019 ,‫)خل��د العامري‬. 206