It is illegal under Indonesian law to create and spread disinformation online. However, operating a social media account under a fake identity is somewhat tolerated as long it is not considered theft of a real person’s identity. Therefore, buzzer teams can and do take advantage of this legal loophole, and while denying any use of fake content, teams supposedly may operate thousands of accounts under fake identities. Spokespeople from Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp have stated that they are aware of these cases and actively delete such accounts in Indonesia, but they have not shared the number of account that have been removed (Potkin & Da Costa, 2019). Volunteers also play a role in the country’s social media manipulation. Many eager activists volunteer to serve on the digital frontline of their political agenda and promote the appropriate content. Political campaigns often have thousands of volunteers who are either organized directly by the campaign team, or by seemingly unrelated organizations. For example, Prabowo’s Digital Team Coordinator denied that his campaign uses buzzer teams, but did admit to the use of “digital volunteers” (Potkin & Da Costa, 2019). Another example of volunteer organizing is a Prabowo-supporting volunteer group called Pride, which allegedly has thousands of members across Indonesia and coordinates its activity using thousands of WhatsApp groups. Moreover, one of Pride’s volunteer team leaders, who has confirmed the use of WhatsApp groups to coordinate volunteer activity, is the founder of a digital marketing agency (Renaldi, 2018). Cyber activity in Indonesia can also be found in civil society groups that work to promote specific political individuals or values. One such group that stands out is the Muslim Cyber Army, or MCA. The MCA is an online organization that engages in disinformation and doxing to promote the primacy of Islam and Islamic values in Indonesian society. Unlike common buzzer groups, the MCA is often described as having no formal structure or leadership, no central headquarters, and no dependence on cashflow. Some think of it as resembling the international hacktivist group Anonymous in terms of its organizational form (Juniartu 2018). Research conducted by the Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network found that the organization can be broadly divided into four clusters of smaller groups, which center their activity around Islamism, but each also add their own emphasis. Many of these smaller organizations have similar names, such as the Srikandi Muslim Cyber Army, the United Muslim Cyber Army, the Legend MCA, and Muslim Coming (Ibid). An investigation by The Guardian found links between the MCA and some opposition parties, military leaders, and influential Islamist activists. Additionally, the police said they are aware of at least one politically influential financier who backs the organization, though details were not provided (Lamb, 2018b). Table 1: Organizational Form and Prevalence of Social Media Manipulation in Indonesia Government Politicians & Private Civil Society Citizens & Agencies Parties Contractors Organizations Influencers Prabowo Subianto, Buzzer groups, Basuki Tjahaja InsightID Purnama, Joko Widobo Muslim Cyber Army, Volunteers, Srikandi Muslim Cyber influencers, Army, the United Muslim Pride Cyber Army, the Legend MCA, and Muslim Coming Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. 188