In relation to Russian propaganda and disinformation in Georgia, some narratives that originated in Russian misinformation campaigns have appeared in the messaging of domestic actors, who deploy these narratives in pursuit of their own political or ideological agendas. Given the density of Russian disinformation campaigns, and cyber troop actors knowingly or not spreading these messages, it is often hard to disentangle Russian disinformation from computational propaganda that is of domestic origins (Visegard Insight, 2020). Table 1: Organizational Form and Prevalence of Social Media Manipulation in Georgia Initial Government Politicians Private Contractors Civil Society Citizens & Report Agencies & Parties Organizations Influencers X X X Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. Strategies, Tools, and Techniques According to the Media Development Fund (MDF), a Georgian NGO, pro-government trolls on Facebook frequently target NGOs and journalists. Between 4 March and 5 April 2019, 15 pro-government trolls were observed. Eleven users had been stolen identities taken from Russian social networks, Odnoklassniki and VKontake; two users were accounts named after characters in TV series; one was a Facebook user; and one was a journalist and student in Batumi, Georgia (Liberali.ge, 2019). The MDF found that the trolls were mobilized against critical media outlets and journalists. In particular, the report states that the Facebook “posts/comments were directed against specific media outlets as well as specific journalists. Rustavi-2 and TV Pirveli were the targets of attacks in this regard and in individual publications, also the Liberali online edition” (Liberali.ge, 2019). In addition to concerns about threats to the diversity of traditional media in light of government influence, according to the MDF, the government frequently employs troll factories to mobilise public opinion on social media and to criticise entities ranging from TBC bank to NGOs and media outlets. Social media trolls and sponsored posts are reportedly particularly prevalent during anti-government protests, where content is spread to share pro-government information (MDF, 2019). Table 2: Observed Strategies, Tools and Techniques of Social Media Manipulation in Georgia Account Types Messaging and Valence Content and Platforms Communication Strategies Bots, Human Pro-government messages, Amplification Strategies, Facebook, Attacks on Opposition Trolling, Data-Driven Instagram Strategies Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. Organizational Capacity and Resources There is very little data about the organizational capacity of cyber troop activity in Georgia. 142