editing video and audio tapes, and making photomontages that are then disseminated via the computers, phones, sites, emails, and Facebook hijacked accounts of the opposition activists that they want to discredit. In addition, sites dedicated to “black propaganda” and psychological warfare have multiplied. These blogs, often operating under the facade of fictitious names, provide a platform for state security agents charged with spreading rumours, attacking the credibility of those who they find “uncomfortable”, and sowing disinformation lines that justify the repressive operations of their institution (Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, 2017). Meanwhile, evidence also indicates the use of bots and trolls by the Cuban government. Experts and activists have tracked dozens of automated social media accounts attempting to masquerade as humans, which are used to amplify certain hashtags and messages to influence what is trending. One strategy employed by them is the use of pictures of white, attractive public figures (Torres & Vela, 2018). According to the Cuban Democratic Directorate, pro-government bots on Twitter were active during the local elections in 2018 (Freedom House, 2019). Most recently, Twitter suspended several pro-government accounts arguing that it detected multiple accounts by one same user were artificially amplifying information. As has been stated, “while the top state-run media outlets have different profiles, they frequently publish similar if not identical articles" (‘Twitter restores some blocked Cuban official accounts’, 2019). Table 2: Observed Strategies, Tools and Techniques of Social Media Manipulation in Cuba Content and Communication Platforms Account Types Messaging and Valence Strategies Pro-government, pro-party Disinformation, Facebook, messages, Trolls, Twitter, Attacks on opposition, Amplification strategies Suppressing speech Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Blank spaces indicate no evidence was found. Human, Automation, Fake and Hacked Organizational Capacity and Resources Cuban pro-government cyber troops are centrally operated by the University of Informatic Sciences (UCI), which is based on an isolated former Soviet military base and has its own tv channel and radio station. According to RadioViva 24 (Alemán de Las Casas, 2020) cyber troops are managed by Eddy Mc Donald Torres, who plans the design and implementation of attacks. They are constituted of UCI students, who only graduate if they comply with their assigned schedule of digital attacks and pro-government publications, but also by other citizens, who are recruited with the promised reward of a stable internet connection and food. Some of the attacks against opposition on Twitter were located not only at the UCI, but also at the University “Marta Abreu” of Las Villas and the Ministry of Communications (Pentón, 2019). Tasks assigned to students also include cyberattacks. Supporters of the Young Communist League (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas - UJC) have also been trained to counter critics to the government on social media (ADN Cuba, 2019). 110