Athens Journal of Law July 2022 (a) communications, reception, transmission, distribution or conveyance of incorrect information with dishonesty or participation;" 38 In March 2017, Article 19 undertook a legal analysis of the Law to ascertain its “compliance with international standards on the right to freedom of expression”.39 They were critical of the offence of criminal defamation40 because they are vulnerable to exploitation “where left to government authorities to enforce”. 41 The provisions of Article 66(d) and Article 68(a) were considered to be too broad and do “not meet the requirements of legal certainty”. 42 They argue that Article 40 gives sweeping investigatory powers and, as drafted, to conduct a search and seize any information, data, paper and documents provided it is from a place where telecommunication services are provided. 43 Similarly, Article 76 has similar national defence provisions, national security, and public interest.44 Finally, they argue that Article 77 allows the Ministry “to suspend services, intercept communications, and to temporarily control services” during an emergency should be stricken, and service restrictions should be narrowly defined, require prior judicial approval and only occur in exceptional circumstances. 45 In the light of the Article 19 analysis and an independent review of the Law by the authors, it is concluded that the law has broad provisions, which are often poorly defined or even undefined, offences are broad, and search and seizure can occur without cause. The only condition is that it be in a facility where telecommunications are provided. In other words, search and seizure can take place anywhere there is a mobile device, which in these interconnected times is almost anywhere. As will be seen later in this paper, the Law was an effective tool used by the Tatmadaw following the coup d’état of February 2021. Even then, they decided to make it even more draconian. Nine days after the coup, the ruling State Administrative Council sent a draft of a revised telecommunications bill, now called a cyber security law, to telecommunications operators for comment.46 The Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business obtained a copy dated 6 February 2021. It was translated, and a legal analysis was sought. 47 The draft, if implemented, would have severe impacts on the usage of social media.48 Section 29 states: 38 Ibid, art 68 Article 19. (2017). Myanmar: Telecommunications Law, 2013. 40 Telecommunications Law 2013, art 66(d). 41 Article 19. (2017) at 12. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid, at 13. 44 Ibid, at15. 45 Ibid. 46 Human Rights Watch (2021). 47 Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business. (2021). 48 The review of the draft, and it impacts on social media, is based on the translated sections included in the analysis published by the Centre and not on the analysis and conclusion of their legal advisor. The authors have been unable to obtain a translation of the complete draft. 39 313 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4150894