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operation was considered as relatively “unsophisticated”332. Facebook also found accounts linked to the Thai military in March 2021. Some 185 accounts and groups were taken down for “coordinated inauthentic behavior.” The take down comprised of 77 accounts, 72 pages, and 18 groups on Facebook and 18 accounts on Instagram. According to the company, the accounts targeted audiences in the Deep South provinces of Thailand. Some advertisements were also generated from these accounts, pages, and groups333. The suspicious use of IO was also documented during the 2023 election period. It was discovered that many accounts were tweeting the same messages to support conservative parties334. The MFP was also a target of conservative media outlets, including TOP News, MGROnline, and Sondhitalk. However, the operations did not seem to yield much success as the erstwhile opposition parties still won the largest share of the votes, while the conservative proxy military parties trailed far behind. 332 333 334 335 Following its victory, MFP was also accused by former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra of using IO to manipulate the election335. Thaksin, who is believed to be the de facto leader of the Pheu Thai Party, claimed that “MFP’s IO” accused Pheu Thai of making a confidential deal with proxy military parties, particularly the Palang Pracharat Party led by Prawit Wongsuwan, a military general who was a key figure during the coup in 2014, and the United Thai Nation Party linked to Prayuth Chan-o-cha. He also said that Pheu Thai Party came in at second place in the election due to this operation by the MFP. Eventually, however, Pheu Thai did later forge an alliance with these two parties to form the new government. Despite being in exile for many years, Thaksin is still an influential figure and remains popular among his supporters. During the period of the 2023 election, Pheu Thai suppor ters bombarded social media platforms, particularly X (formerly Twitter), to support the party while also attacking the MFP and their candidates. Nang Baek, a term referring to hardline Pheu Thai and Thaksin supporters, created many false and misleading narratives against the MFP. Online attacks came in the form of comments under Goldstein, Josh A., et al. “Cheerleading Without Fans: A Low-Impact Domestic Information Operation by the Royal Thai Army.” The Standford Internet Observatory, 20 Oct. 2020, stacks.stanford.edu/file/ druid:ym245nv3149/twitter-TH-202009.pdf. Tanakasempipat, Patpicha. “Facebook Removes Thai Military-linked Information Influencing Accounts.” Reuters, 3 Mar. 2021, www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/facebook-removes-thai-military-linkedinformation-influencing-accounts-2021-03-03. Amarinthewa, Wongpun. “Hunting for IO in the 2023 Election.” The 101 World, 26 Sept. 2023, www.the101. world/unnatural-canvasser-io-election-2023. “Thaksin Praises Move Forward Disruptors.” Bangkok Post, 17 May 2023, www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/ politics/2572640/thaksin-praises-move-forward-disruptors. 92

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Annual Report: Digital Rights in Southeast Asia 2023-2024

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Language

English

Topic

Digital Rights
Digital Surveillance
Information Operation
Internet Connectivity / Accessibility
Internet Restrictions

Author(s)

DigitalReach

Date Published: Aug 6, 2024

Abstract: It is undeniable that information technology has significantly impacted human rights and democracy these days. Different governments around Southeast Asia continually attempt to control digital space through, for example, using repressive laws and regulations, forcing social media platforms to follow their orders, and using spyware and similar technology to surveil critics. In Southeast Asia, democracy and human rights have deteriorated because of these attempts, especially for countries under authoritarian regimes.

In order to better understand the situation, DigitalReach publishes annual reports to present and analyze the events and trends around the region. The 2023 annual report analyzes the digital rights situation in eight countries across Southeast Asia—namely Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam–from January 2023 to December 2023, with glimpses of key updates into 2024, given the timing of its release.

The report format has been changed completely from the previous years. In order to more systematically present the developments observed, the report is organized into three key areas: (1) Legal and Policy Developments, (2) Information Control and Manipulation, and (3) Threats Against Critics and Political Opposition.

From a regional perspective, legal and policy developments in countries that are known to restrict human rights are still mainly about using or coming up with new policies to further suppress human rights in the digital sphere. Countries considered to be more democratic also attempt to change or repeal their laws, but still without a clear sign of improvement toward digital rights.

In terms of information control and manipulation, social media platforms continue to be deployed for political ends, with different platforms serving a specific purpose for each country. The shift toward short video format, TikTok in particular, continued from 2022 to contribute toward information disorder, especially during election periods. The use of video shorts is important when targeting young voters, who played an important role in determining election results in Thailand and Indonesia this year like they did in the Philippines and Malaysia in 2022. State-sponsored cyber armies were also documented, while some governments preferred to assert more effective control of social media platforms. Other important methods related to the flow of information include suppression of media freedom and internet disruptions, which are particularly severe in Myanmar following the 2021 coup.

Judicial harassment is a key form of threat used against critics and political opposition in 2023. It is still common for people in Southeast Asia to be thrown in jail for what they say or do online. Others who do not subscribe to the government’s ideology face online harassment from state-sponsored cyber armies or government supporters. In terms of surveillance, 5 out of 8 countries included in this report have been found to have or are likely to have spyware technology.

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2023-Annual-Report-FINAL-1.pdf
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Myanmar Internet Project

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Annual Report: Digital Rights in Southeast Asia 2023-2024

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